

FROM TRANSITION TO HEGEMONY:
EXTENDING THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF
MILITARY ALLIANCES AND ENERGY SECURITY*

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FROM TRANSITION TO HEGEMONY:
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES AND ENERGY SECURITY

There is great value in trying to figure the relative influence of and relationship between transnational and domestic actors in policy making and agenda setting. Much good work has been undertaken, notably in this volume, in specifying how that balance shifts across particular networks of influence and policy domains, and how these levels of action combine in various ways in relatively complex systems. I believe, however, that this kind of institutional analysis can direct our attention away from the foundations in broader power relations and global transformations that enable these institutional politics and foci to work. I propose, therefore, that a more critical engagement of those deeper structures of power and change might be important to highlight in a new transnational scholarship. Simply put, a middle-range focus was understandable in the decade after communism's collapse in East Central Europe, but now it is time to put questions of global control over key resources and various degrees of national influence in that project back to the center of our analysis of global and postcommunist change.

As questions of military contest and energy security become more central in public discourse, questions of hegemony and empire become manifestly more apparent. When consumer protection and health care reform in the process of accession to the European Union shape our approach to assessing the balance of transnational and national influences, big power relations and stark alternatives hardly seem to matter. Of course more critical theorists will ask why certain regional references become sites for emulation, and others sites for alienation, even in these cases. But the parsimonious theorists among us are unlikely to ask about the conditions that make directions of change obvious until those conditions that lead us to normalize those trajectories shift. That shift has begun.

I have already proposed that such a shift began in 1999, during the course of NATO's intervention in the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,¹ but that shift has become much more substantial following the Rose and Orange Revolutions and the American-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. It is of course possible to interpret the colored revolutions in the same ways that we might discuss adoption of particular sections of the *Acquis Communautaire*; we can look at the particular microprocesses, distributions of resources and patterns of strategic influence to assess the relative importance of Western vs. indigenous sources of change. If one were to propose Western hegemony in the revolutions, or in East Central European accession to the European Union or NATO, some might also suspect political sympathies with anti-democratic transnational or xenophobic domestic forces. Such groans only make my last point of departure more important.

Cultural politics are not just the stuff of protest marches or identity politics. Attempts to influence and transform the meanings, identities, values, and representations accompanying the exercise of power and influence inflect the questions and frames we bring to our scholarship and not only what activists bring to the streets. For that reason, we need to be particularly attentive to how our research programs reinforce normatively defensible hegemonies, or regrettably augment ethically dubious ones. In this paper, I don't presume to categorize these hegemonies, but I do wish to raise questions that might not sit easily with any of them by asking how our research on transnational and national influences on social change articulates the deeper power relations and alternative futures around which I believe we should organize more of our research. In this essay, I take three steps to develop this critical position.

First, I articulate the broader transition culture in which most discussions of transnational and national postcommunist European politics and social change seem to fit, as I make more

explicit the force and energy foundations that underlie that culture, and might change it. Second, I'll illustrate how attending to the cultural politics of military alliances and energy security within Poland raises issues that transition culture does not pose very well, especially when we ask why in one case a matter of security, energy, and democracy contributes to the fall of a government, while in another case, it hardly bears public discussion. Finally, I'll consider the analytical implications of this shift in focus toward the cultural politics of more consequential power relations and global transformations by reformulating the questions with which this volume begins.

TRANSITION CULTURE IN THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL AGENDA

In 1999, we could still speak, without difficulty, of the march of progress toward democracy and markets in the transition away from communist rule. For example, the following appeared on the World Bank website:

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been undergoing a dynamic process of economic and social transformation in their effort to create market economies. Throughout the region, countries have varied in the pace at which they have been able to put in place the components of a successful transformation to a market economy -and in their economic performance.²

This brief account was typical in the 1990s as analysts and politicians worked to give meaning to that decade's remarkable transformations. I have argued that such reflections were more than neat descriptions; they were part of a powerful transnational sensibility that I called "transition culture". This culture mobilized actors around certain logical and normative

oppositions, valuations of expertise and interpretations of history. It of course emphasized the opposition of socialism and capitalism, and the exhaustion of the former and normative superiority of the latter, but it also highlighted the value of generalizing expertise around the workings of market economies and democratic polities. In this culture, publics were perceived to be damaged by socialist rule, and thus not to be trusted. Consequently, resources and research were focused on elites in particular institutional niches and the institutional design around them. Global integration was taken to be given, and only a matter of debate about what course it might take, and who will benefit most from it. Transition culture became, in the cultural sociological sense, a “tool kit” with which actors variously located could realize their interests and define their frustrations. It also wound up helping to reconstitute East Europeans’ interests and strategies in addition to inspiring volumes of social scientific research about this transformation.

I established this cultural formation with reference to cultural artifacts, focus groups, and business practices, but it may be useful to consider its explicit articulation with the dominant frame for interpreting transnational politics that shapes this volume. For our choice may be to do more than add another dimension of transition; we might also consider directly what theory of power and change articulates the research agenda we elaborate.

Orenstein and Bloom characterize the new transnational scholarship with reference to five interlocking claims, with emphases on 1) multiple trends in various fields with multiple outcomes; 2) nonstate actors; 3) the non-diplomatic transnational ties of states themselves, notably in the production of international norms; 4) networked, rather than hierarchical and territorial forms of interaction; and 5) the mutual formation of ideas and interests. Although they refer principally to political scientists in establishing this trajectory, it certainly fits with the way sociology tends to approach power relations within and across societies.³ Unlike much

sociology, however, this agenda searches for ways to highlight the growing complexity of organizational forces without focusing on how deeply structured power relations constitute this space and shape its trajectories.

It is useful for political science to pluralize the range of issues that might be studied, but it is also important to keep in mind how one agenda might set the terms for other agendas. It is novel to consider the relative independence of international organizations from states, but it is also good to keep in mind the layers of influence powerful states can manage when it matters. I also like to consider the ways in which the transnational policy community can do more than reflect power, and work with other players on the scene to create possibilities, but I want to know the limits of action within which this can take place. As most sociologists would, I like appealing to the multiplicity and complexity of global systems, but in that movement I am concerned not to lose sight of the question of whether there are dominant axes that shape more particular contests.

Although moved to ask genuinely new and interesting questions, I can see in this new agenda transition culture's extension, but I don't think that such an extension is necessary even with an emphasis on these five interlocking points. To illustrate this possibility, I compare briefly two works on accession – one that stands within, and another at a more critical distance, from transition culture's assumptions.

In an eloquent comparison of places and issues, Wade Jacoby⁴ has found that in the explanation of transnational policy adoption and implementation, one must attend more to the latter than the former in order to understand outcomes.⁵ In particular, one should attend to the density of recipient actors, and of international organizational rules, in particular issue areas. For example, when domestic actors and foreign rules are both sparse, as in consumer protection, there are relatively few policy innovations and outcomes. When those rules are few but those

actors are many, more indigenously driven continuous learning tends to take place, as in health care. When there are more foreign rules than existing domestic actors organized to care about them, he notes a kind of scaffolding, as when EU regional policy helped to make domestic regional interests and actors. Open struggle between transnational and national actors emerge, however, when there are both lots of rules and many previously constituted actors, evident in the reform of agriculture for the EU and of the military as it moved into NATO. But just as the East European political elites treated it as obvious, so Jacoby treats the wish to emulate and join transnational organizations as points of departure, rather than questions in their own right.

It's important to keep in mind against what Jacoby is arguing – this is no simple transfer of know-how and of policies. One must treat all of the actors in the process of adapting to various kinds of transnational organizations as informed and empowered, ready to resist when their interests are challenged, and to use transnational resources to realize other desires. But their politics, and Jacoby's analysis, function within the frame of transition culture itself.

Transition culture is organized around the notion that democracies recognize the value of contest and markets the value of competition, if within the terms established by the deeper structure of the system in which those contests are embedded and as they are articulated by those privileged within it. This is not even a point of debate when it comes to accession, for after all, the powerful are in the position to decide whether or not those who wish to join them can. In Jacoby's terms, these penitents must be sufficiently distant from the dysfunctional and immoral past they must escape, while assuming the basic functionality, and morality, of the system they aspire to join. Transition culture seems to allow the naming of priests and penitents, so long as the alternatives under discussion are the ones sanctified by the system itself. One begins to depart

from the terms of transition, however, when the sins of the sacred become more apparent, as they are in Zsuzsa Gille's work.

Gille traces the transformation of the waste economy in Hungary, through various periods of socialist management in which reuse, rather than disposal, realized some prominence in waste management.⁶ But the Hungarian reforms of the 1980s helped to produce not only new market mechanisms but also new ways of conceiving efficiency and profit, with additionally harmful environmental consequences. One effect of this was to develop a new technology around incinerators for the elimination of waste, whose substantial toxic effects were publicly acknowledged only after 1989. Acknowledgement of social problems was not the only fruit of communism's end, however.

As Hungary and other EU acceding post-socialist societies sought to affirm their Western credentials, they sometimes had to take in more than lessons in marketing and human resource management. Gille documents how a small capacity incinerator in Gare, Baranya County, won new foreign investments and technology, but in order to make them sufficiently profitable, they had to import additional waste, conveniently from the West, in order to make the technological and economic investments cost effective. By providing the technology, the investments, and the waste, and even by modeling the legislation that allowed it, the European Union in effect created a new landscape in Hungary in this specific instance, but can be seen across the whole of the postsocialist world. It is filled with more landfills, incinerators to deal with them, and the environment resulting from it. Gille therefore argues that transition's radiant European future became a bit more toxic than accession promised, and EU environmental policy would suggest.

Although both Jacoby and Gille thus lay out the complicated interplay of domestic and transnational forces in establishing outcomes, focus on non-state actors in outlining contests, and

highlight the mutual formation of ideas and interests, among other parts of the new transnational scholarship, the cultural politics they extend are different. Jacoby works within transition culture itself, explaining how variations take place within the broad stroke of adaptation to larger structures beyond broad reformulation, although subject to manipulation within its terms. Gille does not find terrific agency to create meaningful alternatives either, but she highlights the hegemonies at work in her explication of how explicit alternatives mask the deeper impositions involved in joining the European Union, where the residents of Gare must choose between public health and economic well being, while West Europeans rejoice in the export of that very choice.

In short, as we consider the new transnational agenda, we should become even more attentive to how the complexity of the system and the mutual constitution of ideas and interests are articulated with the deeper power structures that constitute our views of what is possible and what is not, and who wins and who loses, within and beyond the postcommunist space itself. Much as Gille suggests in her analysis of the waste economy, not all deep power structures are so obvious, and therefore it is important to recall her work to illustrate just how deeply buried some trajectories are in our transnational and national systems. But some of those deep structures are now coming right to the surface, making our attention to control and contests over the major means of power all the more necessary. Indeed, Jacoby himself highlights that possibility.

GEOPOLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITION AND ITS SEQUEL

Noting that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic entered NATO very shortly before the bombing of Serbia in 1999, he references the delicate cultural politics Hungarian and Czech elites managed in supporting their newfound military allies. He finished writing his book shortly after the last war in Iraq began, and highlights similar dilemmas facing political elites as they

moved with the US, against France and Germany, and without the majority support of their publics. By so doing, he highlights one of the underlying conditions that enabled transition culture to be compelling. Transition culture depended on the containment of violence, and therefore the vision of one world into which postcommunist societies might transition.

One of the principles that enabled transition culture to develop thus was complementary behavior by those with control over the means of violence and the use of force. This much I have already said:⁷ First, the Soviet Union had to be “willing” to allow the transformations within Eastern Europe. Second, domestic actors with control over the means of violence within these countries had to eschew violence, or be prevented from using it. Finally, those who wished to launch transition had themselves not only to resist temptations to use violence, but also to be wary of provocations that would justify state violence. Transition depended on peaceful change, and the perception that this peace was in the interests of all nations. With this vision, it could avoid the cycles of violence likely to be found with the exercise of force.

Of course there were some regions in the 1990s that were embedded in violence. Both the Caucasus and the Balkans had violent contest built into their transformations, and thus never simply fit into the story of transition. The passions, loyalties, and legal contests of wartime and post-war postcommunist social change can't be addressed adequately within the framework favored by transition culture, one that minimizes attention to the cultural politics of power and change. But these war stories were critical for the cultural politics of transition itself.

War was a “danger” that might be identified for those, especially in ethnically mixed areas, who didn't take the path of transition, and instead, took the path of nationalism. War could be treated as an anomaly, something that normal Western societies did not undertake. It was contrary to the trend toward integrated and peaceful globalized economy. But when the West

became directly involved in military action against Serbia, that presumption could be challenged. The West erased the possibility of constructing itself as an integrated and simply transcendent party in the unfolding of global change. Regardless of whether one believed that intervention to be the first war launched in the name of human rights or not, the use of force to establish change fundamentally changed the conditions of transition culture. The cultural contest over the exercise of force came to the fore, first of all with naming the quality of power associated with the military power of the United States. Transition culture now, instead of dealing with the decentered power relations of globalization, had to contend with questions of American militarism and imperialism.⁸

This worry is not uniformly held. After all, it was the use of force that enabled, in Serbia, the stirrings of democratic change, which itself was contagious. Just as in 1989 we saw the export of roundtable negotiations, in the start of the new millennium we saw the export of youth movements mobilizing democratic revolutions. Serbia's Otpor activists helped Georgia's Kmara youth movement, which in turn instructed Ukraine's Pora movement of young people. And of course this revival of transition culture is visible among the heads of governments themselves; the January 11, 2005 joint declaration by Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine sounded like a script out of transition culture itself: "We are certain that the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine are shaping the new wave of liberty in Europe... They will usher in the ultimate victory of liberty and democracy across the European continent".⁹ Indeed, Karatnycky echoes that which is a powerful sentiment, within the region and in the West: "the orange revolution had set a major new landmark in the postcommunist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of the region. Ukraine's revolution as just the latest in a series of victories for 'people power' – in

Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s and, more recently, in Serbia and Georgia”.¹⁰

This account is certainly true in the revolutionary sense, but profoundly misleading at the geopolitical level. The foundations of force have shifted fundamentally over this period, with, I would propose, major consequence.

First, in 1989 while the USSR was falling behind the west in military technology, it was still clearly a bipolar world. The USSR could let Eastern Europe go because it was sufficiently confident of its own communist allies’ popularity within their countries. At the same time Russia saw this new peace offensive as a way of countering the military advantage accruing to the US. The Soviets sought a new strategy to ally with Western Europe against the American buildup. The return of Eastern Europe to Europe was designed as a way to open the door for Russia to Europe. Of course we could, with Jacques Levesque,¹¹ marvel at the Leninist arrogance of the Soviets in thinking their parties could realize influence and that Russia might become closer to Europe than the Americans. But in little more than a decade, Gorbachev’s foreign policy aims might ultimately be right, even if they are realized on very different foundations.

Oil and gas have become newly central, or at least evident, in geopolitics. Michael Mann¹² and David Harvey,¹³ for example, make the control over oil central to their argument about the contours of American empire today. With control over oil and gas increasingly central to the world economy, and to military efficacy, and with its trade in dollars critical to American financial interests, direct American control over Iraq not only assures American control over a key productive asset, but also extends American power vis-à-vis Europe and China in the relative extension of those two in their own regional trading blocs in the larger world economy.

Russia of course has as much interest, if not more interest, in the global political economy of oil and gas. The World Bank has estimated that in 2003 about 25% of Russian GDP depended on the oil and gas sector; in that same year, Russia was behind only Saudi Arabia in the number of barrels of crude oil produced.¹⁴ In terms of foreign policy, therefore, Russia must take care about its energy interests as much as anything else, which means that it must attend to Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the transit countries that funnel its oil and gas to its wealthy European consumers.

While the European Union is equivalent to the United States in economic activity, the EU is far more dependent on foreign sources of energy, with 2/3 of its energy imported; oil is the leading resource, providing over 40% of all power.¹⁵ Russia and the EU are especially closely tied; in 2003, 58% of Russian oil exports went to the EU and 88% of its natural gas exports went there; 22% of the European Union's oil imports in 2002 came from Russia, about 16% of EU oil consumption; 32% of EU gas imports in 2003 were Russian in origin, and were about 19% of EU gas consumption.¹⁶ While Gorbachev's peace offensive opened a much wider road to Europe, energy exports now help to pave that road. "Russian oil and gas exporting companies that already all but dominate Europe's energy supplies....According to the International Energy Agency, by 2020, natural gas will account for 62 percent of Europe's energy consumption, and Russia will supply two-thirds of that gas... Germany already gets 35 percent of its oil and 40 percent of its gas from Russia, figures that will steadily increase as Germany pursues its policy of winding down its nuclear power industry," cautions one American observer.¹⁷ Apparently, German policy itself viewed this energy dependency as a way to integrate Russia into Europe on commercial and geopolitical terms.¹⁸

Some authors have gone further to wonder whether a European/Eurasian trading bloc is emerging, designed to challenge American superiority in economic affairs.¹⁹ In this, the European Union and Russia could find common ground with the Euro as the currency that denominates cooperation. And of course this growing role for the Euro runs contrary to American interests, as does growing Russian influence over the European energy market.

By looking at the Rose Revolution and Orange Revolution in these terms, we see something more than transition culture's extension. We see not only an extension of freedom but also critical transformations in energy geopolitics that can reduce Russian influence, and enhance US control over the distribution of energy, with consequent maintenance of American economic influence in the formation of a European./Eurasian trading bloc.

It is difficult, therefore, not to find at least compatibility between American strategic interests in energy and its support for Georgia before and within the Rose Revolution.²⁰ Azerbaijan's "deal of the century" – that extraordinary investment in Azerbaijani oil production - - required a means to transport the Caspian Sea oil to the West.²¹ The Americans refused to countenance an Iranian pipeline, and the Azeri war with Armenia made the most direct route impossible, requiring a Georgian transit. Indeed, even Armenian enclaves within Georgia were avoided in the construction of this pipeline from Baku through Tblisi to the Turkish terminal in Ceyhan.²² This BTC pipeline was officially launched on May 10, 2005.²³

The pipeline has proved a difficult sell, for a combination of economic, environmental, and political reasons.²⁴ Environmental risks accompanying inadequate safety coating for the line led the major private investor, Italy's Banca Intesa, to pull out.²⁵ Even more worrisome, however, are potential terrorist attacks on the pipeline. Perhaps laying the pipelines beyond Armenian enclaves was a reasonable security measure, but these detours were not the only cost.

The extensive American anti-terrorist training of Georgian troops is not only designed to war on Al Qaeda, but to assure the pipeline's security. The Americans, and Georgians, must do all they can to keep the Caucasus peaceful, in order to make this alternative pipeline realize its economic potential. The disruption of this pipeline is not nearly so costly to Russian geostrategic interests, of course.

Practically speaking, therefore, the Russians could do what they can to disrupt the pipeline, or to gain economic control of it. In 2005, Gazprom tried to buy the main north/south import line bringing gas to Georgia and to Armenia from Russia²⁶ reinforcing the strategy they have undertaken in Armenia to use their ownership of the means of energy production to assure control over the Armenian economy. This only reinforces the interest the US has in making the Caucasus energy independent of Russia and squeezing Russia out of Caspian oil and gas transit.

This contest in the Caucasus is a great place to explore the importance, and utility, of thinking in terms of imperial contest rather than transition culture or globalization therefore, but since the Orange Revolution, its utility has become even more obvious in Ukraine.

Of course it didn't take colored revolutions for strategic thinkers to recognize how Ukraine could become a key ally for containing Russia. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski characterized Ukraine as a "geopolitical pivot" in 1997:²⁷

Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south.

Significantly, this is not only a matter of continental location, but critically of energy geopolitics. As it is, Ukraine is, in the eyes of energy experts, an ideal corridor for oil and natural gas to transit from Russia and the Caspian Sea region to European markets. But does a pivot function well as a corridor? Russian leaders clearly did not think so before the Orange Revolution, and most vividly do not think so at the time of this paper's final revision. In a dispute over prices for natural gas, Russia cut off its supply to Ukraine and, Ukrainian leaders argue, cut as well the supply to Europe that crosses Ukrainian territory. Russian leaders accuse Ukrainians of stealing that gas, while Europeans and others castigate the Russians for their unreliability as energy partners.²⁸

Given these politics, one can see why Ukraine seeks to decrease its energy dependence on Russia and to turn to the Caspian region. They must bet on a new Odessa-Brody pipeline and the Pivdenny maritime terminal which would ultimately allow it to transmit Kazakh oil through Poland to Plock and then to Gdansk where it would be exported. On March 1, 2005, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and her Georgian counterpart, Zurab Nogaideli, announced that the Odessa-Brody pipeline would carry oil shipments from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to Western Europe.²⁹ And here, finally, we find Poland's place, and ultimately the challenge of cultural politics around energy security and military alliances, in their American alliance.

Poland is a small transit country for Russian oil, although it does transfer Russian oil to Germany. Poland has been actively involved in Ukraine, with the European Union, to develop this corridor. It is using EU funds to build the pipeline that will connect to Plock by about 2007. By building a pipeline connecting Caspian oil from Georgia and Ukraine, Poland is therefore actively involved in helping to reduce Russian energy power over Europe. While Russian oil and gas might be cheaper, in the end, business leaders argue, it's critical to diversify sources of

oil and gas to assure not only security but good bargaining leverage. This is not just a matter of Polish or European interest, however; it is also a critical question for American influence in Europe, and ultimately, then, a question of military alliances and economic trading blocs.

Such an interest in deep structures of power relations and their implications for global change is less today a matter of theoretical preference. Of course it remains important to be able to identify why some fields of emulation are more contentious than others by referring to the various compositions of rules and resources in particular fields. But it is more important today than it was in the days of transition to attend to the hegemonies at work in structuring those very contests, for the relative consensus underlying transition is fading before a world increasingly torn by the explicit use of violence and its proxy in control over energy. With these conditions at hand, I find it very important to consider the ways in which various forms of transnational and national contests articulate deeper forms of power and global change. Those at work in setting the terms of change seem to think so too.

THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES AND ENERGY SECURITY

Although such a meeting is hardly unprecedented, I learned an exceptional amount during one session at Cambridge University in which the British Ministry of Defence and other organizations, alongside academics, struggled to define the principal challenges to human security in these times. While we can agree that terrorists and their motivations are critical to understanding these challenges, we are not so clear, when we work at a transnational level, about the more fundamental sources of human insecurity. Some raised the question whether the wish to export democracy was, or was not, a destabilizing influence; others doubted whether the enduring and deep Anglo-American alliance could survive the growing divergence of national

interest and values between Europe and America. But most striking, some wondered whether foreign policy is becoming too democratic, destabilizing the alliances that need to be made in order to keep the world secure.³⁰

When questions like that are posed, we should also rethink the broader narratives we use to think about global change. Does the idea of increasing global integration and growing democratization capture what we need to address when we think about the tensions between democracy and good foreign policy? Can we, for example, use Craig Calhoun's formulation of the qualities of a rational critical public sphere to assess the quality of discussion around the conditions of energy security and military alliances? Calhoun writes,

We need to ask how responsive public opinion is to reasoned argument, how well any potential public sphere benefits from the potential for self correction and collective education implicit in the possibilities for rational-critical discourse. And we need to know how committed participants are to the processes of public discourse and through that to each other. Finally, and not least of all, we need to ask how effectively the public opinion formed can influence social institutions and wielders of economic, political, or indeed cultural power.³¹

Can we think about these terms when security is the topic for discussion?

When going to war in Iraq, American leaders could not apparently discuss the real threats Iraq posed and instead focused on issues that were resonant with public opinion – ties to Al Qaeda and possession of weapons of mass destruction – that ultimately proved to be unfounded. The real power Saddam Hussein enjoyed, around oil production in the eventuality of a larger energy crisis, could not be put directly on the democratic table. In part, I would propose, this was because of the effective conquest of the public discourse by terms like “no blood for oil”. This

slogan became one of the dominant cultural frames organizing public protest across the world to the American-led invasion of Iraq. In fact, one can also find this slogan at the extensive website in Poland dedicated to this very issue.³² But much as America's political elites hardly debated the move toward war, Poland's political authorities also failed at such an exercise in democratic deliberation, if for very different reasons.³³

American Values...

The meaning of the Polish soldiers in Iraq for the public, and for the elite, is strategically ambiguous, with the tension between principles and pragmatism animating discussion. For example, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that this decision to join America was based exclusively on normative grounds: “We did not expect to make political profits or economic gains. The decision to support the invasion of Iraq was mainly based on our understanding of the true meaning of alliance and solidarity.”³⁴ At the same time, this is all done with a wink, because within Parliament, there were implied “paybacks” for this support, whether with regard to changing the terms of visas for Poles visiting America, or for other kinds of preferred treatment, like contracts for postwar Iraqi reconstruction. To treat this alliance in public as a quid pro quo would in fact diminish the value of the alliance, but it is useful to examine how the returns on the Polish investment in the alliance might be viewed.

For example, the US Diplomatic Mission to Warsaw displays on its website several such successes – the export of 240 flatbed rail cars to the Iraqi Republic Railways Company by the Wagony Swidnica company. Its majority owner is a US company called Greenbrier, the website notes.³⁵ In July, 2005, Bumar, a state-owned Polish defense company,³⁶ signed a \$100 million contract³⁷ with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to supply 600 Dzik-3 armored vehicles and 115

BTR 80 transports to the Iraqi Army.³⁸ This follows other deals previously negotiated that were worth about 236 million dollars in the supply of helicopters, weapons, ambulances, and fuel and water systems.³⁹ But these are relatively small investments in comparison to what one might expect. It might be more useful, therefore, to consider the transaction that has been called the “deal of the century” in Poland: the \$3.5 billion purchase of 48 F-16 fighter planes from Lockheed Martin,⁴⁰ the biggest military purchase, since the end of the Cold War, by any postcommunist country.⁴¹

This deal, signed on April 18, 2003, offers incredible terms, at least on paper. Not only is payment delayed for 8 years, at below interest rate expectations, and guaranteed by the US Congress, but it also provides offset payments to Poland. The terms of the deal assure that, over ten years, at least \$6 billion in US investments would go to Poland, with estimates sometimes going up to \$7.5 billion and \$12 billion, depending on how one values the multiplier associated with the initial economic outlay. It’s not a simple win/win outcome, however, especially for Polish/European relations.

Poland was also considering other planes for their purchase, planes made in the European Union, the Swedish-British Gripen jet and the French-made Mirage 2000.⁴² Poland has paid for their American choice, with vary degrees of openness. Some speculate, for instance, that PSA Peugeot-Citroen chose Slovakia over Poland for the construction of a new factory as payback.⁴³ Sometimes it’s more explicit. President Chirac, on the occasion of the visit by Vice Minister and Minister of the Economy Jerzy Hausner to Paris on February 28, 2005, reminded him that he should buy Airbus rather than Boeing 787s when Poland considers adding six planes (a \$500-700 million contract) to its commercial fleet in Polish Airlines (the government owns 68% of the stock in LOT). This, he implied, would help Poland overcome the damage that came from

buying the American fighter planes. And if they don't buy Airbus, they could suffer when it comes to the European Union budget in 2007.⁴⁴

This whole public debate is misleading at one level. After all, the fighter jet deal is only one of many, and the only one, in one recent list, that went to an American firm rather than a European or Israeli firm,⁴⁵ but this particular aircraft deal strikes a chord because it is tied so closely to military alliances, and the perception that Poland is insufficiently European, and is rather a Trojan Horse, or even Trojan Donkey, for America in Europe. That perception has of course been heightened recently by the speculation that Poland hosted secret detention camps for prisoners taken in the American-led war on terrorism. Transatlantic and East/West European tensions grow, too, with this very uncertainty, leading European Union spokesman Frisco Roscam Abbing to warn that Poland would face sanctions if any breach of European treaty rules had been made.⁴⁶

Although we witnessed a major shift in the Polish political authorities with parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall of 2005, it is not obvious that there will be any major changes in this Polish/American alliance. Indeed, the new government announced that instead of bringing Polish troops home early in 2006, as the previous government intended, they would remain through the end of the year.⁴⁷

There are, nevertheless, many reasons why we should imagine such a shift: the Polish-American alliance has been developed at the cost of Poland's European relationships; it has depended on muted discussion in the Polish public, distorting democracy's vigor; it has cost 17 Polish lives⁴⁸ in a conflict most Poles don't believe they should engage,⁴⁹ even one that violates Catholic sensibilities;⁵⁰ and finally, it is based on a quid pro quo that is increasingly perceived to be dubious at best. Poland still does not enjoy the visa situation its West European neighbors

enjoy, and the deal of the century looks a bit less dramatic. In short, we need to ask why Polish/American alliances remain so firm when there plenty of reasons one could imagine their attrition.

One might simply argue that a strong Polish/American alliance is necessary to assure Poland's place in Europe, and its security overall, but the cultural politics reinforcing that security might enjoy many layers. For example, when French President Chirac chastised Poles and other East Europeans as if they were children, telling them that "they missed a god opportunity to keep quiet" in the debate over the invasion of Iraq,⁵¹ we find not only an illustration of West/East European cultural tensions. We also find, in this faux pax, a terrific opportunity for East Europeans to respond with outrage and to use their American affinities to remind the arrogant that they are nobody's inferiors.

In brief, the cultural politics of Poland's military alliance with America in general, and particularly around Iraq, deserves more extensive analysis on many different levels. We could try to explain it as Polish leaders do, with reference to high-minded notions of solidarity and commitments to liberation, forged in the domestic struggle against communism with abiding American assistance. Those norms are clearly operative. We could try to explain it with reference to the significance of ties made around the military industrial complex, by considering how the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin, and US foreign policy worked to assure Polish loyalties, but we would have to explain how European countervailing pressures failed to win out over American preferences. We might dig even deeper, and wonder to what extent our Polish colleagues were not only thinking about post-war military contacts, but also energy security itself in the long run, recognizing the dangers of Russian dependency in ways that their European Union neighbors to the west hardly appreciated.

We may not find the answers to these questions by assessing what takes place in democratic public deliberations, however, because their very formulation requires an expertise, and a sense of future risks and needs, that can hardly be developed in democratic public spheres. That, at least, could be one reason why Polish political elites are wary to subject the alliance with America to much democratic deliberation. They are not so wary, however, when it comes to identifying the threats posed by Russia. Here, we often find that superficial interpretations of public expressions capture the basic problem. This was especially evident in 2005 around Orłęgate and Jan Kulczyk.

Russian Threats....

Jan Kulczyk is Poland's richest man, about 4 times richer than the second richest person, with a personal fortune worth around \$4 billion. His investments include a 14% stake in TPSA, the partially privatized former state telecommunications company, and 10% in PKN Orlen, the Polish oil refinery based in Gdansk. But he misstepped. While the story was still not complete on my writing, I rely on what I learned during my visit to Poland in March, 2005, for my ethnographic present.

In 2002, Jan Kulczyk proposed to then Prime Minister Leszek Miller that they could merge the Gdansk Refinery with Orlen and sell both of them. Although formally illegal for anyone other than someone from the Ministry of the Treasury to negotiate about selling state property,⁵² Kulczyk met in October with Wagit Alekperow, the chief of Lukoil, in London and tried to sell him this idea.⁵³ He also learned, he said, that the Russians tried to bribe the minister of the economy and the chief of the plant, which he reported to the proper Polish authorities. Still a few months later, when meeting with a Russian spy, Vladimir Alganov (whose friendship with

Jozef Oleksy caused the latter to resign as Prime Minister on January 24, 1996, and who as first secretary in the Russian Embassy in Warsaw spied on the country for years but who is now retired and a representative for the Russian oil industry)⁵⁴ in Vienna, he supposedly discussed the possible sale of Orlen and Gdansk Refinery. Present at the meeting were Polish intelligence agents who took notes indicating that Kulczyk reportedly said that he could reach “pierwszy” or the number one, whom those investigating assumed to be President Kwasniewski, to get his full support for the sale.⁵⁵

This controversy becomes important for two reasons. Kulczyk had dealt previously with foreign interests and major privatizations, including that of TPSA and French Telecom. But this time, he was dealing with Russians, and with energy, something that affects security much more than telephone services, and that inspires political passions like nothing else.⁵⁶

This charge led to the formation of a parliamentary commission of investigation dedicated to Orlen in July 2004.⁵⁷ Ultimately, the original concerns motivating the commission’s foundation paled in comparison to the intrigues that grew out of this investigation. As the left would have it, the commission was motivated by a political agenda led by right wing parties. Its leading actors included Zbigniew Wassermann of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc) and Roman Giertych of the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin) (both of whom are exceptional interrogators, the first of whom is a former prosecutor, and the latter of whom is the vice chair).

The commission extended its mandate to investigate ties between the President’s chancellery and business leaders, and who was connected with whom.⁵⁸ Connecting charges of corruption to questions of patriotism itself, the man who would ultimately lead his party to parliamentary victory in the fall of 2005, and whose twin brother would become president,

charged Kwasniewski with having a “file” in Russia.⁵⁹ Building on these questions of corruption and treason, and faced with potentially incriminating evidence of his own complicity in the corruption scandal, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the presidential candidate most clearly associated with President Kwasniewski, resigned on September 14, 2005 from the race for president. On September 25, 2005, the 146 page report was submitted to the Marshal of the Sejm, in which Roman Giertych proposed that President Kwasniewski sought to sell the Polish fuel sector to the Russian agents.⁶⁰

Such tensions overwhelmed the Polish public sphere in the middle of 2005. They reflected an invigorated public sphere, raising questions of military alliances, energy security, and democracy in ways that, while highly politicized, would no doubt have won critical acclaim from other quarters had such questions been raised around energy security, military alliances, and democracy in the decision to ally with America in the occupation of Iraq. My point is not, however, to make the obvious one that the Polish public sphere can be mobilized by Russophobia,⁶¹ while problematic aspects of its American alliance are handled with a relative wink. That is, in a certain sense, obvious given sympathies and suspicions in the Polish electorate.

Instead, I wonder whether we can judge the quality of these matters of energy security in the terms that Calhoun offers – is the Orlengate affair superior because of the extensive debate offered around questions of energy needs and national security, or inferior because it was so clearly tied to a political agenda designed to weaken the left in Polish politics? Or is the public discussion around the Polish alliance in Iraq and the purchase of F-16 fighter jets superior because it ceded so much to political authorities who claim to understand the character of threats, and the value of military alliances, better? Does the nature of one’s answer simply depend on

apriori political affinities, or can we develop methods, and critical approaches, that will identify the conditions under which relative consensus reflects an accurate assessment of the real state of needs, and when raucous debate is not just good for its own sake, but might even be a distraction from what needs to be discussed? In short, can we address the conditions of hegemony not only in terms of how it masks the exercise of power, but also in terms of the degree to which it reflects realistic assessments based on rational-critical discussion within appropriate publics? That, it seems, is the key question within national, and transnational public spheres. And that requires a different extension of transition culture, moving its exploration not only into a transnational sphere, but more directly into a question of power and culture.

FROM TRANSITION TO HEGEMONY?

The conditions that enabled transition culture's questions to be central are disappearing. Colored revolutions reanimated its political passions and appeared to invigorate transition culture's scientific terms. Proving the domestic sources for democracy's embrace in struggles against dictatorships is a good thing, but it also distracts us from the nightmare questions that the 1990s enabled us to overlook. Control over the major energy resources enabling economic development remain highly concentrated, and can serve as a reason for war, and as a substitute for military occupation in the direction of East European change. Debating who orchestrated orange and rose changes doesn't help us imagine how imperial contests will be resolved when the bloom has left the revolutionary flower; it especially won't tell us how the location of pipelines will affect economic futures and national sovereignties.

How do we figure the politics of these fundamental contests beyond transition culture then? Empirically, we can compare how particular military alliances and energy security matters

are discussed in publics, and how these agendas are presented to different policy communities. As I have suggested, it is useful to compare how quickly one might search for evidence of corruption when Russians seek to influence energy security in Poland with the debates over Polish decisions to go to Iraq in support of America. But before political cultures are invoked as sufficient explanations, we can consider just how much these dispositions, and other actions like the purchase of Lockheed Martin jets, fly in the face of our assumptions about Polish wishes to be European.

These empirical investigations can also challenge our cultural political sensibilities. While there are few in American academic circles who embrace the dispositions of the League of Polish Families or now reigning Law and Justice parties, this right wing disposition may have been right to emphasize the dangers of Russian influence over Polish energy infrastructures in light of what has happened in the beginning of 2006 between Russia and Ukraine. Transition culture's optimism around the rationality of global market integration may have made analysts and politicians both a bit overly dismissive of East European nationalist skepticism of Russian commercial commitments. Too, it fits nicely with European anti-American sensibilities to wonder about Poland's role as Trojan Horse, but it's not obvious that, in light of the growing combustibility of energy politics that Polish elites were not right in anticipating the value of gaining control over Iraqi energy resources, and gaining American support to move the Orange Revolution ahead on energy security grounds alone. The Trojan Horse might just save Europe! But then those very points about energy security and military interventions could, and should, have been debated. And that, I believe, is what questions of empire, and of hegemony, raise.

I find Michael Mann⁶² and others to be quite right to wonder about the articulation of military power with economic, political, and cultural power in the development of America's

incoherent empire. But we should also pose the same questions around Russia, and rethink the place of the European Union, in the middle of it all.

Of course we can't speak about the European Union in singular terms, even though the conventions of disciplines and of our language might enable us to speak of American and Russian strategies without gasp. It is clear, however, that we should be considering the ways in which different national leaderships are struggling to maneuver within the European Union to shape its own response to recurring rival American and Russian use of military and energy resources. We should also consider, therefore, how power relations within the European Union shape national dispositions in those rivalries.

In the end, it's not only a matter of geopolitical contest around oil and guns, even if that has been my focus. I also find that we should be attending, as Zsuzsa Gille suggests, to those deeper structures of power and change that lie beneath the surface, ones that interface not only with the means of energy production and violence, but also with environmental capacities to secure public health and sustain environmental well being. For that reason, we should not only consider how the new transnational agenda might be explored within particular sectors, or even how it might articulate with emerging imperialist contests. We should also explore, I believe, those issues that endanger security even when publics and politicians have little room on their immediate agendas for their address. A focus on energy, fortunately, allows that very engagement, and invites us to consider the ways in which ideas and interests around environmental security might inspire new visions of military alliances and energy needs. But it won't realize this vision by working within the terms of transition culture itself.

Even as we explore the articulation of increasingly complex transnational and national levels of policy and practice, we might also inquire directly into the ways in which competing

hegemonies work in this era. It might not always be apparent if we view the articulation of power only in terms of who does what, but we may appreciate those hegemonies more if we also consider how those actions reproduce, or transform, the major axes of power in the world system. Maybe we could take military alliances and energy security for granted in discussions of European accession, but in a time of war and increasing competition for energy security, it's no longer obvious how the world will be integrated, or whose hegemony will reign, much less how those choices resonate with longer term environmental security. We might, however, in the spirit of a more critical transition culture, consider whether more open public discussion of those very issues in a transnational public sphere would contribute, or not, to better solutions than those that seem to prevail today.

¹ Michael D. Kennedy, Cultural Formations of Postcommunism: Emancipation, Transition, Nation, and War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

² See <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eca/eca.htm>, May 17, 1999.

³ Consider the relative prominence of sociology in Robert Latham and Saskia Sassen (eds.) Digital Formations: IT and New Architectures in the Global Realm. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

⁴ Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

⁵ For my full review of his work, see the forthcoming review in Contemporary Sociology, from which I draw for this section.

⁶ Zsuzsa Gille, From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of History: A Social Theory of Waste. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming.

⁷ Cultural Formations of Postcommunism 2002.

⁸ For intriguing, if still insufficient, discussions of the relationship between globalization and imperialism, see the discussions ranging from Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990 to Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization or Empire? New York and London: Routledge, 2004. George Steinmetz, "Return to Empire: The New US Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective" Sociological Theory 23:4(2005):339-67 develops a new conceptual framework for thinking about the peculiarity of American empire.

⁹ See <http://www.brama.com/survey/messages/36904.html>

¹⁰ Andrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs March/April 2005 pp. 35-52, and proposed on p. 35.

¹¹ The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

¹² Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire. London: Verso, 2004.

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- ¹³ David Harvey, The New Imperialism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- ¹⁴ See <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html>
- ¹⁵ See <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/euro.html>
- ¹⁶ See <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27055.htm>
- ¹⁷ See <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1346965/posts>
- ¹⁸ According to Alexander Rah of the German Council of Foreign Relations in Berlin, cited in Mark Landler, "Gas Halt May Produce Big Ripples in European Policy" New York Times January 4, 2006, p. A6.
- ¹⁹ See Harvey, pp. 84-85 among others.
- ²⁰ See <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav120103.shtml#>
- ²¹ For extensive discussion, see Bulent Gokay (ed.) The Politics of Caspian Oil. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.
- ²² For a Project Summary of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline, see http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/bakutbilisiceyhan_btc_pipeline_project_azerbajjangeorgiaturkey/index.php
- ²³ "Linefill of the BTC pipeline began at the Saganchal oil terminal in Azerbaijan on 10 May 2005 and the first export of oil from the Ceyhan marine terminal in Turkey is due to commence during the second half of the year." See <http://www.caspiandevlopmentandexport.com/ASP/BTC.asp>
- ²⁴ Liz Fuller, RFE Report, September 24, 2004.
- ²⁵ See <http://www.carbonweb.org/documents/PR011204.htm>
- ²⁶ See <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/02/8f1205e3-2826-4470-811a-bc9d9ef577a3.html>
- ²⁷ The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives
- ²⁸ Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia Cuts Off Gas to Ukraine in Cost Dispute" The New York Times January 2, 2006, pp. A1, A7.
- ²⁹ See <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/03/01/053.html>
- ³⁰ A New Security Paradigm, The Cambridge Security Seminar, 30 and 30 July 2003, A Seminar Record. Cambridge: C-SIS and Cambridge Review of International Affairs. www.cambridgesecurity.net/pdf/new_security_paradigm.pdf
- ³¹ Craig Calhoun. (2003a) "Information Technology and the International Public Sphere," pp. 229-251 in D. Schuler, ed.: Digital Directions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- ³² See <http://www.iraq.pl/index1.html>
- ³³ Eleanor Shelton, "Two Polish Visitors Take Sides over Coalition of the Willing," Journal of the International Institute <http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=jii;cc=jii;sid=ba4f2cdde059303fd71f79feba15b0a6;rgn=main;view=text;idno=4750978.0011.204>

³⁴ A statement made at Columbia University in September, 2004 reported in Robert Little, “U.S. dollars wooed ally in Iraq coalition,” Baltimore Sun, October 17, 2004. <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7097.htm>

³⁵ “First Polish Rail Cars Delivered to Iraq” , 22 February 2005. <http://poland.usembassy.gov/poland/rail.htm>.

³⁶ <http://www.bumar-waryski.com.pl/html.informacje.html>

³⁷ “Iraq to Take Delivery of 22 Polish Armored Vehicles” Defense News.com
<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1310771&C=landwar>

³⁸ “Iraqi Reconstruction News”
http://poland.usembassy.gov/poland/iraq_reconstruction_page.html

³⁹ Grzegorz Holdanowicz, “Bumar-Dostawy do Iraku za 236 mln USD Raport 01/2005”
<http://www.altair.com.pl/files/r0104/0105bumar.htm>. It is interesting to see how the Iraq Development Program portrays this deal: Iraqi Defense Minister Ziad Cattan reportedly said at the signing ceremony for this event, “Poland has helped us a great deal, so we’re trying to build strong links between companies from our two countries”. The note concludes with this observation: “Several Polish companies have complained about being shut out from lucrative Iraqi reconstruction contracts despite the country’s leadership of a multinational division in the stabilization force and its contribution of 2500 troops”. <http://www.iraqdevelopmentprogram.org/idp/news/new600.htm> Ziad Cattan, who now lives in Poland, was in charge of procurement for the Iraqi military until 2005, when the Iraqi Justice Ministry charged him with corruption. Solomon Moore and T. Christian Miller, “Iraq: Before Rearming Iraq, He Sold Shoes and Flowers” Los Angeles Times November 6, 2005. <http://www.corpowatch.org/article.php?id=12758>. He is a citizen of Poland. See <http://www.ziadcattan.com/en/historia.html> for his own story.

⁴⁰ Robert Little, “U.S. dollars wooed ally in Iraq coalition,” Baltimore Sun, October 17, 2004.
<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7097.htm>

⁴¹ Andrzej Stylinski, “Poland signs multibillion-dollar deal to buy F-16 jet fighters,” The Detroit News, April 19, 2003.

⁴² There are some other military deals, of course. For example, Polish defense officials signed a \$1.2 billion deal for the delivery of 690 Finnish-made troop carriers over the next 10 years.

⁴³ Krzysztof Trebski, Ludwik M. Bednarz, and Marłgorzata Zdziehowska, “Woz albo Airbus: LOT wybiera nie tylko samoloty ale i sojusznikow dla Polski,” Wprost March 13, 2005, pp. 40-43.

⁴⁴ Ironically, the whole article is about how European politicians use their political influence to sell their nation’s products. This is not corruption, just the nature of the business, it seems. Of course it’s not just about planes; the business of government investments extends much further. Krzysztof Trebski, Ludwik M. Bednarz, and Marłgorzata Zdziehowska, “Woz albo Airbus: LOT wybiera nie tylko samoloty ale i sojusznikow dla Polski,” Wprost, March 13, 2005, pp. 40-43.

⁴⁵ Krzysztof Trebski, Ludwik M. Bednarz, and Marłgorzata Zdziehowska, “Woz albo Airbus: LOT wybiera nie tylko samoloty ale i sojusznikow dla Polski,” Wprost, March 13, 2005, pp. 40-43.

⁴⁶ Judy Dempsey and James Kanter, “EU Looking into Report of Secret CIA Jails” International Herald Tribune November 4, 2005. <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/11/03/news.cia.php>

⁴⁷ “Poland postpones Iraq Troop Withdrawal” BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4562838.stm>

⁴⁸ <http://icasualties.org/oif>

⁴⁹ In response to the question, “Do you support the participation of Polish soldiers in the operation in Iraq, or not”, about 70% of the population has expressed a negative opinion between June 2004 and March 2005, with between 20 and 30% offering their support. Komunikat z Badan, “Opinie o Obecności Polskich Żołnierzy w Iraku I o Innych Interwencjach Zbrojnych”, CBOS, Warsaw, April 2005. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_075_05.PDF

⁵⁰ See Halina Bortnoiwska, Marek A. Cichocki, and Krzysztof Madel, “Moralność po Iraku: ‘za wasza I nasza wolność?’” *Wież*, 3(545)(March, 2004):11-26 for one excellent discussion.

⁵¹ “Chirac lashes out at ‘new Europe’” *CNN.com/world* February 18, 2003. www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/spj.irq.chirac/

⁵² Katya, Andrzej and Dorota Bartyzel, “Spy, Tycoon, LUKoil Stir Up Polish Politics” <http://www.ocnus.net/cgi-bin/exec/view.cgi?archive=56&num=14675>

⁵³ “Jak Kulczyk grał z Rosjanami?” <http://biznes.interia.pl/news?inf=569750>

⁵⁴ “The Oleksy Case” <http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/sutyagin/>

⁵⁵ (from Polonia). Also see http://eb.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=oneclick&country_id=1730000173

For the story that prompted Aleksander Kwasniewski to refuse attending the commission meeting, see Tomasz Butkiewicz and Marcin Dzierzanowski, “Aleksander K” *Wprost* March 13, 2005, pp. 18-21.

⁵⁶ <http://biznes.interia.pl/news?inf=569823>

⁵⁷ Its members include Roman Giertych (LPR), Andrzej Celiński (SdPL), Bogdan Bujak i Andrzej Różański (SLD), Zbigniew Wassermann (PiS), Konstanty Miodowicz (PO), Andrzej Grzesik (Samoobrona), Andrzej Aumiller (UP), Józef Gruszka (PSL), Zbigniew Witaszek (FKP) i Antoni Macierewicz (RKN). <http://biznes.interia.pl/news?inf=522583>

⁵⁸ Ordynacka is one association that appears prominently in the speculations, whose members were mainly members of the Związek Studentów Polskich from the mid 1980s, the networks among whom are described in Jan Pinski and Krzysztof Trebski, “Prawnik Pierwszego Kontakt”, *Wprost* March 13, 2005, pp. 22-24, in which Andrzej Kratiuk and his role in Mrs. Kwasniewska’s foundation is discussed.

⁵⁹ Jarosław Kaczyński said “Moskwa dysponuje takimi dokumentami dotyczącymi przeszłości prezydenta, które go czynią nie suwerennym w jego decyzjach” Ewa Milewicz, “Po co on tak jeździ do Moskwy?” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, March 11, 2005, p. 2.

⁶⁰ “Jest Raport Komisji ds. Orlenu” *Gazeta Wyborcza* September 27, 2005. <http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/kraj/1,58300,2936969.html>

⁶¹ Richard Bernstein, “Corruption, Russophobia Weigh on Poland,” *The Moscow Times.com*, January 28, 2005. Issue 3094. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/01/28/201.html>

⁶² Michael Mann. *Incoherent Empire*. London: Verso, 2004.