Paper presented at the 5th ECPR Pan-European Conference on EU Politics. Porto, Portugal. June 24-26, 2010
Description: This paper explores what preferences governments held in the negotiation process on the European Constitution regarding European Union (EU) institutional provisions and decision rules. Applying logistic regression and ordered probit techniques to the data collection 'Domestic Structures and European Integration' (DOSEI), and complemented by graphical and descriptive explorations, the paper reveals cleavages between governments’ positions that can be discerned in the negotiation process on the European Constitution. Regarding decision rules to be used in the Council, member state preferences clearly differ according to the length of EU states' membership, with older members, in general, favoring a low decision threshold for the Council. Similarly, older EU states were stronger supporters of the application of qualified majority voting (QMV) than were newer EU member states. In addition to this, our analysis reveals that smaller EU states and those facing Euroskeptic domestic publics were more supportive of a low decision threshold in the Council of the EU.
Madeleine O. Hosli, Department of Political Science, Leiden University and U-M Netherlands Visiting Professor, Fall 2010.
Publication date: 2010