Legislative Candidacy in Dominant Party Systems: How Candidate Selection Shapes Electoral Outcomes*

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Abstract

The modal regime type in sub-Saharan Africa is a dominant party system and these regimes are ubiquitous throughout the world. So, why do individuals compete as opposition candidates in such systems where those opposition parties have little chance to win? This paper explores these questions in the context of Tanzania, a dominant party regime where the ruling party has never lost an election. I provide an original theory which offers insight on why individuals choose to candidate with the opposition rather than long-standing incumbent parties and also why they seek candidacy instead of not contesting election. It then focuses on a specific section of the theory: the role of candidate selection procedures in dominant-party systems. Using results from an original dataset combining survey research with legislators, electoral candidates, and non-candidates and the political histories of Tanzanian parliamentarians, it assess the extent to which candidate selection procedures influence the decision of prospective candidates to seek office.

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1 Introduction

African party systems since the late 1980s have been largely characterized by long-standing governing parties. The reelection rates of heads of state and their legislative majorities in multi-party elections in the sub-continent is about 82%.\(^1\) As of May 2011, 18 of 48 (37.5%) of regimes in sub-Saharan African have held legislative majorities and the executive office for three or more successive elections, while an additional 5 regimes have been in power since the late 1990s without having yet won three elections.\(^2\) There is some variation in the democratic credentials of these regimes as well as the quality of opposition—either stable or “pulverized”\(^3\)—but they nonetheless share one basic reality: elections set who is in power and the distribution of spoils for successful candidates and parties and the voters who delivered victory and, in sub-Saharan Africa, these elections rarely yield diverse outcomes.

This paper explores why individuals seek legislative office in dominant party systems, where the prospects of opposition are so bleak. Problematically, democracy requires opposition forces but individuals appear to have little incentive to join them. Focusing on the barriers to legislative candidacy for prospective candidates in dominant party systems—particularly those with limited democratic credentials—I present a theory framed broadly to accommodate both incumbent and opposition participation in regimes where the costs and benefits of competing for office may vary dramatically in comparison to competitive regimes. This submission comprises the extant literature and theory on the question **Why do individuals seek elected legislative office in dominant party systems** and leverages data collected regarding the 2010 elections for (1) the Parliament of Tanzania and (2) the

\(^1\) Based on Przeworski (2011) and Lindberg (2006) respectively.

\(^2\) Holding legislative majorities and the head of state for three or more elections are frequently used as criteria for classifying regimes as “dominant party.” See Bogaards (2008).

\(^3\) van Eerd (2010, 2) in reference to Sartori (1976)’s description of highly atomized party systems with many small competitors.
House of Representatives of Zanzibar (a semi-autonomous region of Tanzania), where the Chama Cha Mapinduzi has held power since independence.

Data presented in this paper are drawn from a multi-faceted empirical strategy that combines (1) in-depth interviews conducted from 2010-2013 with party elites, (2) a survey conducted with 132 current legislators from Tanzania, (3) a survey of 104 losing candidates from the 2010 elections in Tanzania, (4) a survey with 420 party elites who were prospective, “non-candidates” from the 2010 elections (including unsuccessful nomination seekers and youth and women’s wing members), and (5) the personal and political biographies of 725 Tanzanian Parliamentarians from 1995 through the current 2010-2015 term. The resulting dataset chronicles the political lives, decisions, and experiences of these 1249 individuals as 68,543 “person-years,” allowing both cross-sectional comparisons between individuals and, importantly, chronicle the paths of these individuals into politics and legislative candidacy (or not).

The paper begins by identifying three major theories of opposition candidacy in competitive authoritarian regimes. It then posits a fourth, which brings together insight from the comparative literature to offer a more comprehensive account of legislative candidacy in dominant party systems like those found throughout sub-Saharan Africa, where clientelism, weak ideological party credentials, and potential repression exist in an environment of multi-party competition. After introducing the broad theory, the remaining contribution focuses on an empirical investigation of one specific component of the theory: intra-party nomination and selection procedures and how they structure election chances for prospective governing party and opposition party candidates. It concludes pointing to future analysis of these data in order to trace sequences into legislative politics in dominant party systems.
2 Motivating Literature: Why Become Opposition Candidates in Dominant Party Regimes?

In this section, I discuss research from competitive authoritarian regimes that can help form a theory of legislative office seeking in dominant party regimes.

2.1 Theory 1: Co-optation

The first explanation presents candidates as individuals who compete in elections in order to gain material goods for themselves and their constituents. The reason they compete as candidates in opposition parties, then, is to get co-opted by incumbents. By competing on an opposition ticket, a candidate can illustrate his or her power to the incumbent party and that he or she is sufficiently valuable to be bought off (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). In this view, competing in an election generates public knowledge about a candidate’s level of support and can facilitate that candidate’s co-optation at an informationally efficient market price. Entry into the opposition party is easy and partisan attachment to the opposition weak, while incumbent party candidacy is difficult and controlled by the party.

2.2 Theory 2: Strategic Defection

A second theory argues that prospective candidates strategically defect to the opposition when incumbents appear weak (Magaloni, 2006). Simply put, individuals want to be in the party that looks like it is headed in the winning direction. A candidate wants to ensure investing a party by competing as one of its candidates is wise and that his or her political career will rise with it. Even parties with a stranglehold over power set electoral winning margin targets in order to keep momentum on their side and remain appealing to prospective candidates. Conversely, an opposition party which appears doomed will struggle to attract
ambitious politicians. Like the first account, opposition party entry as a candidate is easy and occurs when a prospective candidate seeks out an opportunity as a challenger.

2.3 Theory 3: Ideological Differences

The final account portrays individuals who join the opposition as “Ideologists.” For the opposition, the prospects of winning in the short-run are low and the material costs of being in the opposition in the short-run are high, as they forego material “goodies” from the incumbent government. That these political organizations have little to offer in terms of private benefits to candidates suggests they tend to attract individuals who are not motivated by such goods (Shefter, 1994). Ideological attachments and medium and long-term policy platforms can lure candidates to the opposition. Scholars have provided evidence that individuals who join the opposition are bound by pronounced desires for public goods, national development, and deeper democratization, rule of law, etc (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006; Scheiner, 2006). Unlike the first two explanations, this approach suggests individuals may become candidates because of some previous experience with or knowledge of the party—perhaps as a dues-paying member—because they are drawn in by its features. Further, it allows that some opposition parties offer non-material goods to prospective candidates better than dominant party for things they have a comparative advantage of offering—enhancing executive oversight, criticizing the government on the floor of Parliament, and the like.

2.4 Issues with Existing Theory 1: Portability to Dominant Party Regimes

Theories on co-optation of opposition legislators and candidates in authoritarian regimes arrives at conclusions based on intuition about what governing parties do, not the opposition. Governing parties have the power to craft legislatures and do so to their benefit, so scholars argue these institutions are created to co-opt the opposition forces to support the regime.

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and to identify where to distribute material goods to placate dissenting forces. Derived from this intuition is that opposition then is responsive to the goals of the incumbent because why would incumbents utilize legislatures that do not serve their intended purpose? However, only rarely do scholars illustrate that co-optation “works” for incumbent parties by reducing dissent and bringing on board opposition candidates.\(^5\) For an incumbent party to improve its electoral standing by co-opting candidates, we anticipate that a co-opted candidate is followed by his or her supporters. But the decision to support an opposition candidate can be costly and citizens who have already paid that cost may be hard for incumbents to win over. We have evidence that dominant incumbent parties discourage opposition by employing a “punishment regime” that withholds developmental and private goods from constituencies with opposition support (Magaloni, 2006; Weinstein, 2011). The idea that a strategic candidate can simply deliver his or her voters to incumbents en masse only makes sense if voters move in blocks based on easily providable material goods and if those voters who already risked losing material goods can later be won over by them.

The logic of strategic defection in dominant party regimes given incumbent under-performance raises doubt. Firstly, dominant parties are remarkable in their resilience. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, many have faced corruption scandals and weak—sometimes catastrophically poor—economic performance and nonetheless manage to maintain an image that there is little chance of being defeated. The counter-factual expectation from this theory—that a lack of incumbent weakness should yield lower numbers of candidates for opposition parties—is also problematic. Whether the dominant party is very strong or weakening, opposition parties frequently run candidates in as many constituencies as financially and logistically possible. The final theory—that opposition parties recruit different candidate types along ideological lines—is the most plausible, yet sits awkwardly in the context of

\(^5\)Notably Reuter and Robertson (2012) provide evidence linking legislative co-optation with lower levels of political dissent in Russia, providing some evidence of this.
third-wave democratic transitions which have commonly yielded so-called “patronage democracies” where clientelism serves as a substitute for credible ideological positions and performance evaluations (Chandra, 2004)\textsuperscript{6} and political parties centered around flag-bearers with powerful distribution networks and offers scant evidence of real policy credentials (van de Walle, 2003).

2.5 Issues with Existing Theory 2: Missing Micro-logic of Candidacy Decision-Making

An additional short-coming of these insights that they leave much remaining to be explained about the micro-logic by which an individual considers the viability of seeking legislative office with a particular party, and if so, which party. What benefits and costs do potential candidates consider when evaluating whether to seek office, what alternatives are available to them when making this decision and what intra-party and regime level factors affect this decision?

3 New Theory: Drawing Insight from the Literature

In this section, I draw insight on the micro-logic of candidacy decision making—primarily from the American context—and adapt this theory to the context of dominant party regimes where massive incumbency advantage prevails. I then provide an original theory of why individuals seek legislative office equipped to address motivations for both opposition and incumbent party candidacy, as well as non-candidacy. Because other chapters of this book address the portability of the theories discussed in the previous section, the remaining paper

\textsuperscript{6}Chandra (2009) clarifies a patronage democracy as “a democracy which fulfills the following two conditions: (1) the public sector dwarfs the private sector as a source of jobs and a provider of services, or a large private sector exists but is under state regulation; and (2) elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating these jobs and services. The key aspect of a patronage democracy is the power of elected officials to distribute the vast resources controlled by the state to voters on a individualized basis through their discretion in the implementation of state policy (22).
focuses primarily on introducing an original theory in this section and empirically evaluating it.

### 3.1 The Micro-logic of Legislative Candidacy

The prevailing wisdom as to why individuals become legislative candidates that they are ambitious and politics serves these ambitions (Aldrich, 2011; Schlesinger, 1966). This literature is largely drawn from the context of advance democracies—particularly the United States—and finds candidates motivated by three factors: career prospects, policy objectives, and the prestige of political office (Fenno, 1973). Candidates join parties, then, because parties help candidates reach their goals by increasing chances of being elected (Downs, 1957). Much of the research on legislative candidacy has focused on the types of individuals who seek out these offices and their personality traits, linking these traits to desires to hold power over others. Laswell (1948), even notes that politicians hold an “intense and ungratified craving for deference” (39). Those intimately familiar with the politicians dominant party systems in sub-Saharan Africa may find this convincing, as the nature of a patron-client relationship often implies such deference of the client.

Alongside this research on the personality types and psychology of office-seekers has emerged a greater focus on the incentive structure facing prospective politicians. As Matthews (1984) emphasizes, a whole host of factors, including “the size of the legislature, their terms, their level of compensation and fringe benefits, their geographical locations, and their demands of party-time or full-time commitment, all affect the costs and benefits of legislative service to different individuals” (553). Taking into consideration these possible reasons, (Black, 1970) formalizes the decision of a rational individual to seek office or not as guided by the following:

$$U(0) = (PB) - C$$

(1)
where $B$ represents the benefit a legislator obtains from receiving from office. $P$ captures the probability that the candidate will be elected to that office, or what (Kazee, 1980) describes as “how hopeful (or hopeless) the political situation” facing the candidate is (80). $C$ is the cost of seeking election, which for most researchers, including Black, most readily means campaign costs, though it does not preclude other sorts of costs associated with becoming a candidate. The resulting intuition is that if the expected utility of being a candidate $U(0)$ is positive and greater than the benefits that would accrue from utilizing resources $A_i$ in an alternative manner [e.g. $U(0) > U(A_i)$], the individual will seek candidacy. Consequent evidence from Black and others shows that in highly competitive districts (where $P$ is low and $C$ in campaign costs is high), only individuals who expect to gain a lot from office choose to compete.\(^7\) Research on US councilpersons shows that individuals seeking legislative office do so with ambitions to hold these positions of power and further that the ambition extends vertically, to offices of higher prestige (Rohde, 1979). This is particularly convincing in systems where the most elite political positions—ministerial posts, for example—are selected from the legislature, as is often the case in many of the dominant party systems found throughout the world (and even more so in sub-Saharan Africa).

### 3.2 Original Theory

The model drawn from the American Politics literature is a useful starting point for developing a theory of candidacy in the context of dominion party systems.

#### 3.2.1 What are the benefits ($B$) of legislative office in dominant party regimes?

We now know that candidates are of multiple types and that expected benefits of serving as legislators relates to personal characteristics of the prospective candidate. For example,

\(^7\)Paraphrasing (Matthews, 1984, 561)
Barber (1956) and Ziller et al (1977) highlight how personality attributes such as self-esteem, social characteristics like being from urban or rural areas, and professional backgrounds like a law-degree can differentiate the goals of legislative candidates. (Payne and Woshinsky, 1972) have discovered a number of different important consumption benefits for elite-level politicians in the context of countries like France and Colombia. They sketch seven possible factors which shape incentives for politicians to compete, which I summarize in table 1.\(^8\) They find the most evidence in support of the presence of the programmatic and status motivations of legislative candidates and argue that each candidate has a single, primary motivation.

Table 1: Candidate Incentives and Payoffs, Payne and Woshinsky (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Working upon specific, concrete public policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Attaining work and exhibiting prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adulation</td>
<td>Receiving the affection and praise of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Committing oneself to a transcendental cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation</td>
<td>Relieving anxieties of conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conviviality</td>
<td>Pleasing others and being accepted by them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game</td>
<td>Competing with others in highly structured interactions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike Payne and Woshinsky (1972), who argue that candidates carry one primary expected benefit of being in office, interviews with legislative candidates conducted in the dominant party system of Tanzania from 2000-2013 and competitive “patronage democracies” Ghana and Mauritius in 2009 suggests that individuals have many possible motivations for seeking candidacy and further than they might accrue even without a high probability P of winning an office. I advance that there are four primary benefits of legislative office which candidates seek, which can be cast as four types: **Material Gains, Prestige of Office, Ideology/Policy Aims, and Career Opportunism.**

In contrast to Payne and Woshinsky (1972), I argue that candidates do not hold a single motivation with primacy, but each candidate values these benefits with different

\(^8\)Content of table originally appears in Matthews (1984, 560).
weights. Prospective candidates hold ambitions to obtain some mixture of these four factors, while minimizing the potential costs they bear when choosing to join a particular party. In this sense, \( \mathbf{B} \) represents a vector of benefits with weights assigned to each benefit based on the significance of each attribute for the prospective candidate. There may be candidates that more or less fit a single ideal-type—perhaps a materialist who values only enrichment to be gained from office and frets over the cash he or she has to give out in a campaign or an ideologist who cares only about implementing policy. Interviews with candidate suggests that they place some weight on each of these factors.

When choosing to align with a political party, candidates select the party that maximizes some utility function based on these preferences in terms of what they can gain from competing with them, as parties themselves will also offer each for the four factors with varying proficiency.

Long-standing incumbent parties offer tremendous access to the government, prominent positions in the cabinet, and informal power in a multitude of ways and thus have a comparative advantage in offering these benefits to candidates. However, the ability to influence the direction or shape of the party’s ideology and orientation is limited in such a party. On the other hand, the opposition may offer great chances to be active in the Parliament in taking government to task for underperformance and being its popular face.

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Table 2: Benefits of Legislative Office in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Gains</th>
<th>Prestige of Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MP Salary/Sitting allowance; tax/housing benefits for MPs; personal &amp; familial enrichment; CDF/discretionary development $$ for town; club good allocation to clients; preferential contract kick-backs</td>
<td>Local/regional popularity; Personal/household autonomy (for women); NGO conferences in 5-star hotels; Being on television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology/Policy Aims</td>
<td>Shape/implement policy (democracy, rule of law, development); advance socio-political issues (women’s rights, education, etc.); Local/Patriotic obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Opportunism</td>
<td>Access to other government jobs; experience/training for elected offices; develop political and business networks; “pay dues” to party for later ambitions; be co-opted into other party; join party “on the rise”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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in the media. What parties want out of candidates is similarly party specific, corresponding with that their own organizational needs are at a given time. Thus coherence between what parties offer to their candidates—including the types of ideological influence and positions they take—shape the compatibility between what candidates expect to gain from legislative office if they are elected in each party under consideration and what they ultimately want out of seeking office. Thus, where theories of “ambitious” politicians might fail to predict any rational prospective politician might seek a nomination from an opposition party, this adaptation can accommodate the motivations of distinctive candidate types. By considering the benefits of legislative office as both candidate and party specific, we substantially complicate the theory but succeed in rooting it in contexts of unbalanced political competition and less institutionalized political players.

3.2.2 What are the costs (C)?

Competing in elections is very costly for candidates. Legislators in Ghana and Tanzania indicate having spent thousands of dollars of their own savings during election time just on personal contributions expected by their constituents.⁹

Elections campaigns are commonly by political parties, but often this support is not enough to offset large personal costs, even for long-standing incumbent parties that have access to government coffers. This anecdote illustrates the costs that a candidate must bear in an election campaign for the incumbent Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania:

“When it came to organizing the campaign team, I had to seek out and hire individuals who had different skill sets to get voters to support me—a team for common people, one for teachers, one for religious leaders, and one for the traditional leaders. I used the sungusungu (community police) because they are

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⁹Even in low income countries, the “price to play” is quite high. In one instance, a Ghanian member of Parliament reported the cost of a party primary campaign cost over $300,000!
great commanders and will follow orders from me. My budget for the election was about 65 million TZS (appx $45,000), of which the party contributed 5 million. The party pays for some print materials—shirts, for example—but only ones that have the president. If you want your own shirts, you must make them. The same with posters, radio advertisements, a speaker system and the rallies, unless they are held in common with the President or Vice-President. We are also expected to help organize with the Diwani (Local Councilors) and support their campaigns. In my case, I was able to use my popularity to get some contributions from businesses to the campaign, but I still ended up paying most of it.”

Opposition candidates face even greater barriers, as the parties they are representing face substantial finance challenges. Dominant parties use their legislative super-majorities to pass legislation that stacks the odds again opposition competitors financially, allocating government funds and media sources in ways that advantage the party in power and further, strict campaign finance regulations that only the dominant party can risk violating without fear to punishment. This makes it difficult for opposition parties to attract anchors to finance the party, especially when opposition affiliation means unwanted attention for these individual from the government and more generally, high-quality, well-skilled public officials.

Such issues exacerbate already substantial resource inequality in the electoral realm, as Civic United Front Chairman Professor Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba notes,

“As a party whose support is primarily from the ‘grassroots’—people working in the informal sector and in lower economic classes—we need to seek out candidates from the middle class, who are educated and are credible leaders. However, when we seek out these individuals, because they are approached perhaps, they expect that there will be a lot of funds available to them from the party for them to contest the elections. But our resources are extremely limited and you need the candidate to be able to financially support themselves” (May 7, 2013).
Opposition candidacy in more nefarious dominant party regimes can be quite costly in candidates’ private lives, including risking financial status and physical security. There is evidence that dominant parties discourage opposition activity by employing a “punishment regime” that withholds developmental and private goods from constituencies with opposition support. (Magaloni, 2006)\(^{10}\) Deciding to compete in an opposition party thus can impact a broad range of individuals other than the candidate alone, including family, friends, and supporters in the constituency. Table 3 sketches out a few of the potential costs of seeking and becoming a legislator in Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Table 3: Costs of Legislative Candidacy in Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal security risk; “punishment regime” for constituency/family;</td>
<td>out of pocket patronage; campaign expenses not paid by party; entry fees; reputation damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3 What shapes the probability of being elected?

In determining what drives the probability of winning an election, the greatest short-comings of Black (1970)’s simple model becomes clear. Most fundamentally, the likelihood of winning an election is structured by internal party factors and the market in which candidates seek out party nominations and parties seek out prospective candidates. Winning a party’s nomination is essential for effectively competing in an election in most political systems and in places like Tanzania where independent candidates are not allowed, compulsory. Amongst the greatest barriers to winning elected office is obtaining a party’s nomination to contest a seat on its behalf. An important part of political reality is that parties have procedures that control who represents the party as candidates. If the barriers to candidacy are low to joining a opposition party and high for incumbents the allure of incumbent parties could be lower than much research anticipates. The theory I present thus considers the probability of

\(^{10}\)There is evidence of this occurring in Tanzania in the allocation of local government funds (Weinstein, 2011).
winning office in two stages: at the intra-party nomination and in the election contest.

3.3 A Theory of Legislative Candidacy in Dominant Party Systems

There are three key steps in the candidacy process: (1) choosing to seek candidacy and in which party, (2) passing through the party selectorate phase, and (3) the actual electoral contest. At the first stage, individuals simply decide whether or not they wish to seek candidacy. This decision is non-trivial for prospective candidates, especially for prospective opposition candidates. Although candidates do have control over influencing nomination prospects and managing their electoral campaign, I treat their ability to do so as roughly fixed at the moment they decide to seek candidacy, the first stage of the theory. Many candidates choose to not seek candidacy, either because their odds of advancing are low or perhaps because the costs of competing are too high. This is represented by Outcome 5 in figure 1). Those who choose to seek candidacy must decide in this first step which party to seek candidacy with and then proceed to the second stage of the candidacy process (in the figure, those choosing opposition parties follow the path in the top of the figure; those selecting the dominant party the bottom half).

In the second stage of the candidacy process, a party selectorate determines whether an individual will be selected as a candidate of the party, or if their candidacy bid will be unsuccessful (Outcome 3 for an opposition party, Outcome 4 for a dominant party). If they fail to receive a nomination, the individual obtains some benefit of seeking the seat—in experience in the party, prominence amongst the elite, and more—and bear the costs of seeking the seat, which in competitive primaries can be very high. Those who get the opportunity to compete in the elections take on the costs of both the intra-party and inter-party contests, the benefits of winning a nomination, and, depending on the outcome of the election, may obtain the benefits of serving as a legislator. A successful election bid lands a
candidate in Outcomes 1 and 6 (Opposition, Dominant party, respectively) and the benefits of what come from doing so will depend greatly on the nature of the party, the candidate, and the compatibility of the benefits parties offer to their legislators.

This approach improves on existing theory in a number of ways. Firstly, it considers candidacy decision-making where the value of the benefits of what one party or another offers its legislators depends on a match between what a prospective candidate wants and what that party is equipped to deliver. Secondly, it reinforces the notion that seeking candidacy unsuccessfully is not costless but also losing nomination contests and elections may also help prospective candidates succeed down the road. Finally, it looks towards the hurdles prospective candidates face far before election day and how much intra-party selection processes influence candidacy decisions.

Figure 1: Steps Towards Office Holding in Dominant Party Systems
4 Candidate Selection in Dominant Party Systems

In this section, I discuss the party-candidate courtship process and the barriers to winning a party’s nomination to compete in dominant party systems. Empirically, the focus shifts to more frequently discussing party systems in sub-Saharan Africa as an artifact of my own knowledge and data availability, rather than scope conditions of the theory. Candidate selection is a technical task performed by parties out of necessity. Yet, it ultimately determines the level of internal party democracy and has downstream consequences representative at the level of national inter-party competition. As has been noted elsewhere, “The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party.”

Some research has argued candidate selection in sub-Saharan Africa shows that incumbent parties have more restrictive candidate selection procedures than opposition parties, an intuition that follows research from advanced democracies showing the size of a political party is negatively correlated with open candidate selection procedures. Dominant parties require longer-term investment in the party from potential candidates long before they have a chance to stand in elections, even as early on as party sponsored youth soccer teams, church groups, and programs similar to Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts. Other evidence suggests the opposite: that there is a positive relationship between the openness of candidate selection procedures and the electoral performance of a party.

Figure 2 shows the inclusiveness of the candidate selection process for 53 political parties in 14 African countries. Such data are difficult to collect, particularly in competitive

\[\text{In future iterations of this paper, I plan to extend the empirical discussion in this section third-wave democratizers.}\]

\[\text{Schattschneider quoted in Ohman (2004), and also in Olber (1974).}\]

\[\text{Based on Ohman (2004).}\]

\[\text{Candidate inclusiveness measure is drawn from an expert survey conducted by the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project at Duke University. The measure is based on the question, “In Parliamentary or Congressional Elections, do the following parties enable simple rank-and-file party members to select nominees of the party for electoral legislative office, for example, through primary elections, caucuses, or mail ballots?” Response options are discrete (1=Yes, all districts; 2=Yes, some districts; 3=No) and were submitted by country expert coders. Non-integer values reflect disagreement amongst the coders.}\]
authoritarian regimes, and number of Africa’s dominant party systems are absent. Based on this selection of countries, however, two important views emerge. Firstly, dominant parties in dominant-party regimes on average use party primaries as a part of candidate selection compared to opposition parties in those regimes and all parties in non-dominant party regimes.\textsuperscript{15} Yet, these regimes also have more centralized control of the actual final decision-making process.\textsuperscript{16} This helps establish our first expectation regarding candidate selection processes in dominant party regimes:

**H\textsubscript{1}:** Control over the candidate market is more centralized for a dominant party than it is for the opposition.

\textsuperscript{15}Welch’s t-test p-value .02 for mean assessment of dominant parties as more inclusive

\textsuperscript{16}Welch’s t-test p-value 0.1 for dominant parties having lower average values to this question from the same expert survey “Which of the following four options best describes the following parties’ balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections?” (1= National party leaders, 2=Regional/state-level party organization, 3=Local/municipal actors, 4=Cooperation between levels)
4.1 How might primaries benefit dominant parties?

Holding primaries means making a decision to distribute some power of a political party away from its center (Duverger, 1954). Research finds that opposition—especially weak opposition parties—are more likely to select candidates through primaries than powerful electoral parties (Deluca et al., 2002). Decentralizing candidate selection procedures has risks. Most obviously, the central party apparatus has relinquished power to local party elites and empowered them to carry out a function critical to the long-term performance of that party. In rewarding candidacy to more electorally popular candidates, it also chances that these individuals will spend time on constituency service at the expense of supporting and implementing the party’s policies (Gallagher, 1988). It also offers less protection for elite legislators—ministers, deputy ministers, and committee chairs—whose greater burden of government service may lead them to de-prioritize constituency duties.

Given that we see a number of dominant parties employing primaries as a method of candidate selection, why then might these parties use primaries at all? Katz (2001) and Field and Siavelis (2008) both argue that large, catch-all parties and parties which graft to state institutions and utilize state resources—both characteristics of dominant parties—makes them compatible with party primaries because they “bypass party activists to appeal to the rank-and-file or voters” (Field and Siavelis, 2008, 631). Firstly, it potential damage from legislators deviating from party policy goals is unlikely for dominant parties simply because of their stranglehold over the legislature. With legislative majorities, and often super-majorities, the ability of a single legislator to influence policy away from the dominant party’s goals is minimal. Empowered party whips and frequently laws prohibiting independent candidates also means that deviation from the party line can be punished by removal from the party and, consequently, from the legislative post.\footnote{This occurred to a former Minister and CCM representative in Zanzibari Mansoor Himid, who was removed from the party for promoting positions towards Tanzania’s constitutional reform in conflict with the party’s stated policy in 2013}
Another possible reason dominant parties use primaries to select their candidates is that primaries are a party’s way of paying lip-service to constituency demands but, decisions about the fitness of candidates party’s center. This has historically been the case in Tanzania and is documented for the Botswana Democratic Party and the People’s Democratic Party (of Nigeria), two other dominant parties in sub-Saharan Africa (Ohman, 2004). Each dominant party holds party primaries but the final candidate list is ratified by the party secretariat. As Rahat and Hazan (2001) note,

“if the parties maintain, or reassert, control over certain phases in the candidate selection process, the phenomenon of democratization need not lead to a loss of control for the party organization, nor to a decline in its functional capacities...the party can still remain the master of its internal fate.” (313)

Dominant parties may also use primaries when facing growing competition from opposition parties and devolve central party power through primaries may help hold opposition challengers at bay. Research points to this response by two former dominant parties—in the case of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico and the Norwegian Labour Party—which undertook this strategy when facing increasing pressure from opposition parties (Rahat and Hazan, 2001). Implementing party primaries often leads to an electoral bump for that party, as it leads to the selection of more electorally popular candidates (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich, 2006) and individuals with more resources and ability to campaign (Serra, 2011).

$H_2$: The dominant party will perform better in constituencies where a candidate is replaced through a primary turnover.

However, nominations in uncompetitive electoral constituencies are hard to come by. This is because these constituencies are the ones most likely to yield legislative seats for primary winners and thus feature more candidates and more fierce spending and competition between them (Ichino and Nathan, 2012). This provides a related expectation:
Primaries for dominant parties will have a higher number of competitors in comparison to opposition party primaries.

Considered together, the electoral bump obtained by holding primaries may not be than meaningful for the dominant party. If primary turnovers take place in party strongholds, then the bump of having a more popular legislative candidate running for office can increase votes for the party but over what is already a winning margin.

It is worth noting that primaries may also help manage intra-party conflict. For disenchanted party elites, the outcome of a public primary is more difficult to dispute than clandestine deals made behind closed doors. It also can discourage defection to opposition parties, as losing a party primary can hurt the electability of a candidate and make opposition prospects less desirable. This argument has been applied to the decision of the PRI to adopt political primaries while facing high levels of intra-party conflict (Poire, 2002). My empirical design is not well equipped to test this consideration empirically.

4.2 Additional Expectations Regarding Candidate Selection

Whether or not a party holds primaries to select candidates, most research affirms that obtaining nominations for very popular parties is more difficult compared to weaker and less popular ones. Firstly, because of the comparably better prospects for election in a dominant party—given selection for candidacy—on average, the number of primary competitors and the control the party exercises over the process will be the primary reasons prospective candidates are not selected. The pool of prospective candidates is simply larger and filled with more qualified politicians. On the other hand, opposition parties struggle to court qualified candidates and sometimes over-ride the selection of a candidate via party primary because the individual is simply not seen as competent to be a legislator\footnote{CUF Zanzibar election director Muhene, October 29, 2012}

H₄: Barriers to nomination in opposition parties and the dominant party
differ. The main barrier to opposition party nomination is the political qualifications of the individual.

A related expectation is that prospective candidates for the dominant party will be of higher quality in the sense of commitment to the party as well. When “party stalwarts” filling primary ballots, concerns over dedication to party ideals and laws in the legislature are dampened. With a pool of prospective candidates so large, even extremely popular up-start prospectives struggle to gain enough popularity to win a nomination. Dominant parties may also intervene when there is fear that insufficiently loyal individuals will be selected by the primary process, either directly by distributing clientelistic goods on behalf the party loyalist or indirectly by running publicity campaigns against other primary competitors and using state institutions to derail their efforts.¹⁹

*H₅*: Dominant party candidates will have more party qualifications in comparison to opposition candidates.

*H₆*: All candidates will rate primary prospects for a dominant party as bleaker than opposition parties.

To sum up, the probability of a candidate winning any given election is the joint probability of (1) winning the nomination from a party selectorate and (2) winning an office by obtaining a sufficient amount of support from the electorate. While an electoral victory may be all but guaranteed for a candidate of the dominant party, getting onto the election ticket is no small task. This also means that legislator tenure is shaped by many factors out of the control of a legislator: they may face several strong challengers in subsequent primaries simply due to an extensive candidate queue. In spite of performing their duties as a legislator well, they can be booted out of their position for another from the dominant party fold. This offers a final testable implication:

¹⁹One iconic example from the 2010 primaries in Ngeza, Tanzania resulted in a party loyalist who finished third in the primaries being chosen over the two candidates who beat him and the primary winner being arrested and accused of not being a citizen of Tanzania.
Incumbent legislators of dominant parties are more likely to fail re-election bids due to intra-party challenges, while opposition legislators’ failed re-election bids occur on election day.

5 Understanding Tanzania’s Dominant Party Regime

5.1 Tanzania and CCM’s Dominance

This broader project addresses why individuals seek legislative candidacy and what determines their electoral success. The theories guiding this project encompass all regimes where regular, somewhat free elections take place and yet the opposition has limited prospects of winning elections. Dominant party regimes—where one party has controlled the government for at least three elections in a row—are ideal environments to study these dynamics. Tanzania and Zanzibar’s semi-autonomous government are both dominant party regimes par excellence.

After Tanganyika received its independence from Britain in 1961, then leader “Mwalimu” Julius Nyerere established the Tanganyikan African National Union and embarked on one of the more extensive party building projects in the history of sub-Saharan Africa. (Levitsky and Way, 2009; Bienen, 1967). This accelerated with the integration of the Zanzibar archipelago to form Tanzania following the overthrow of the Omani/Zanzibari sultan. Thus was born Tanzania, the party later rebranded as Chama cha Mapinduzi, and the era of single party dominance that defines the relationship between the two.21 Elections continued to be held but with multi-partyism constitutionally prohibited; through this and the subsequent period of Ujamaa, the CCM came to control nearly all political, social, economic life

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20See: Bogaards (2004, 2008). While is important debate about what constitutes single-party dominance, Tanzania meets the dominance criteria by any classification scheme I am aware of.

21Chama cha Mapinduzi means “Revolutionary Party,” in reference to the merger of TANU and the ASP taking place after the Zanzibari revolution and, in name, in the early 1970s. The name Tanzania reflects the unification of mainland Tanganyika and the three islands that make up Zanzibar.
throughout the country (Barkan, 1994; Hyden, 1999; Msekwa, 2006; Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994). Nonetheless, within this single-party framework, elections were competitive and legitimate, incumbents were ousted with rates similar to established, two-party democracies (Maliyamkoko, 2002).

When Tanzania implemented a series of elite-driven and donor-supported democratic reforms in the early 1990s, its brand of “top-down democratization” (Hyden, 1999, 143) produced very little in political competitiveness.22 The 1995 polls were fraught with electoral irregularities, failures by the National Electoral Commission to provide ample voting materials, and government assistance for campaigns that was siphoned almost entirely to the CCM (TEMCO, 1997; Kaya, 2004). In a sense, this election was the “abetura”23 for opposition parties in Tanzania; an ephemeral moment to contest the governing party that quickly passed. The subsequent elections in Tanzania have been more legitimate but the opposition has only capitalized on this in the form of legislative seats in a limited way.

5.2 The Legislatures of Tanzania: Bunge and Baraza la Wawakilishi

Tanzania features two legislatures. The Parliament of Tanzania contains 239 directly elected seats from single-member districts. Its constituencies include mainland Tanzania (the former Tanganyika) and 50 constituencies in Zanzibar. There are currently an additional 112 seats and of these, the majority are women’s special seats which are allocated to each political party proportional to their percentage of constituency seats.24 While designed to increase women’s representation, these seats enhance the electoral disproportionality and consequently advantage the dominant party. Additional seats come from presidential app-

---

22 Many see that after stepping down from the Presidency in 1985, pushing through these democratic reforms in Tanzania was largely a product of Julius Nyerere’s influence (Maliyamkoko, 2002).

23 Joseph (1998) coined this term to refer the brief opening for democratic governance in sub-Saharan Africa during the early 1990s, which was shortly after closed shut.

24 The number of Parliamentary seats has been as high as 357 since the 2010 elections, but has dropped due to deaths and further because the President may appoint a number appointees with a constitutionally specified maximum but may fill them at his discretion and has seldom utilized all of the positions.
pointment, seats reserved for appointment from Zanzibar, and the Attorney General serves as an ex-officio member. Opposition parties have performed poorly in each of the four multi-party elections in Tanzania. Opposition parties managed only to attain 7% of seats in the 2000 elections and under 15% in 2005 (TEMCO, 2006, 2000; Msekwa, 2006). However, they garnered a larger proportion of electoral support in 2010 (for example, the strongest two opposition parties won together over 35% of the presidential vote). The current parliament features two primary opposition parties—Chama cha Wananchi (called also CUF or the Civic United Front) and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (for short, Chadema)—as well three smaller opposition parties, including (NCCR-Maguezi) which was strong during the 1990s but has lost popularity, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP).

The seat distribution of the Parliament is shown in figure 3.

In addition to the Parliament of Tanzania, there is a second legislature in Tanzania which is located in Zanzibar. The Zanzibar House of Representatives contains 50 constituency seats and an additional 32 allocated by appointment and for reserved women’s seats allocated in the same manner as for the Parliament. The 50 constituencies are identical to the 50 Parliamentary constituencies, but the House of Representatives has a limited mandate in Zanzibar’s semi-autonomous government. That mandate is for what are considered “non-Union” issues (e.g. education, health, but not immigration) within the boundaries of Zanzibar. Historically, political competition has been strong between CCM and CUF with CUF winning over 45% of the presidential vote in all elections but 2000, when they boycotted the contest. Other parties operate in Zanzibar but have made little inroads in gaining support. The distribution of the current House of Representatives is shown in figure 4.

Studying these dynamics in Tanzania is critical. For a number of reasons, the country is understudied in political science and frequently treated as an “outlier.” Yet, Tanzania’s dominant party system resembles patterns of competition in nascent political systems in...
Africa and around the world. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has been in power since Tanganyika and Zanzibar’s independence (1961; 1964, respectively),\footnote{Including its two predecessors, mainland Tanzania’s TANU and Zanzibar’s ASP.} won four multi-party elections 1995-2010, and been minimally impacted by intra- and inter-party challenges (Hyden, 1999). A key difference at the macro-level is that opposition in Zanzibar has succeeded in breaking into government through a power-sharing agreement in 2010, while the opposition in Tanzania has made steady but small gains across elections. This allows for additional descriptive comparisons across the cases.
5.3 Candidate Selection in Tanzania

In the case of Tanzania, obtaining a nomination from the incumbent Chama Cha Mapinduzi is extremely challenging. CCM holds preferential primaries for candidates at the constituency level in which all current official members (card-holders who have paid their dues) may participate. However, it maintains the final decision of candidates in its central decision-making mechanism the National Electoral Committee and the candidate lists that the National Electoral Committee are prepared by the party’s even smaller central committee in secret. In spite of a fairly open seeming procedure, the preferences of members are often disregarded when the lists are finalized at the party’s headquarters, even at the level of offices as high as
the Presidency.\textsuperscript{26} The selection of candidates in frequently controversial and primary losers who are not complicit with the party’s decision can face challenges from the party and from the state security arm.

The selection processes for opposition parties in Tanzania differ somewhat by party. The Civic United Front—a party with its strongholds in Zanzibar and the coast of the Tanzanian mainland—uses a procedure similar to that of Chama Cha Mapinduzi. They face similar struggles to select candidates they see as who would make the best leaders but also ones who are electorally viable—sufficiently popular and skilled as a politicians in order to actually win the contest and perform in office. Indeed, balancing these two dynamics is amongst the greatest electoral challenges the party faces as in attempts to translate its electoral wins into activities in the government.\textsuperscript{27} CUF uses a primary systems with ratification of candidate lists the duty of the central office, like CCM. CHADEMA uses an upward cascading system by which names are passed from local to district and regional offices and ultimately decided upon within the party secretariat. The means by which it chooses its candidates and leaders is subject of considerable conflict within the party.\textsuperscript{28} Still, each party leaves the final decision making power in the hands of the party secretariat.

6 Empirical Strategy

To gain inferential leverage on the two sets of hypotheses—associated with the question of why an individual would compete with an opposition party and how those candidates win—I developed a multi-fold research design.

\textsuperscript{26}Of note is the career of Dr. Mohammed Gharib Bilal, the current vice-president of Tanzania. He was selected thrice by CCM supporters in Zanzibari to be their candidate for the Zanzibari presidency, and in each instance, a different individual was chosen to be the Zanzibari presidential candidate (Abeid Amani Karume from 2000-2005 and and Dr. Mohammed Shein from 2010-2015).

\textsuperscript{27}CUF Zanzibar election director Muhene, October 29, 2012

\textsuperscript{28}Interview, Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, November 10, 2012
6.1 Initial Elite Interviews

Field work began initially in 2010 and spanned through 2013, with first efforts aimed at vetting my theory of candidacy decision making with leaders and elites of the political parties in Tanzania. Table 4 shows the party figures who collaborated at this stage of the project, helping shape the theory and also providing invaluable insight on party organization and candidate selection.

Table 4: Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Figures</th>
<th>CCM</th>
<th>CHADEMA</th>
<th>CUF</th>
<th>NCCR</th>
<th>Non-Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SG Abdoulrahim Kinana</td>
<td>SG Wilbrod Slaa</td>
<td>SG Lipumba</td>
<td>SG Mbatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG Vuai Ali Vuai</td>
<td>C(S): Zitto Kabwe</td>
<td>DSG Julius Mtatiro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG Feroz</td>
<td>C(S): John J. Mnyika</td>
<td>DSG Ismail Jussa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS: (BLW Speaker)</td>
<td>PS John Heche</td>
<td>PS: Salim Bimani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Mporogonyi</td>
<td>PS Deogratius Munishi</td>
<td>M (ZNZ) (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (ZNZ) (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Head of Security</td>
<td>Dir. Elections (ZNZ)</td>
<td>Dir. Elections (TZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Press Sec.</td>
<td>MPs (4)</td>
<td>Dir. Region (ZNZ) (5)</td>
<td>Dir. IT, Elections (TZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Sec (ZNZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td>MPs(4)</td>
<td>Dir. Elections (ZNZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs (12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Benson Bana, UDSM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOR (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td>HOR(24)</td>
<td>Dr. Max Mnuya, UDSM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir. Region (ZNZ) (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Chris Maina, UDSM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: (D)SG-(Deputy) Secretary General/Chair; M(S)-Minister (Shadow):
PS-Party Secretariat/; MP(ZNZ)-Member of Parliament TZ/(ZNZ); C-Candidate; Local Govt-L

6.2 Legislator and Party Survey

I implemented out a survey with with current members of the Parliament of Tanzania and of the Zanzibar House of Representatives. These interviews were conducted during the annual budget sessions in 2013, April-June for the Tanzania Parliament and June-August for the
Zanzibar House of Representatives. Interviews were carried out by enumerators face-to-face in both cases.

Because this broader research project addresses the decision of individuals to seek legislative candidacy (or not) and also how they succeed electorally, this presented a complex task of interviewing not only legislators, but also individuals who were candidates and did not win and individuals who were not candidates. In any given election, candidates compete with the incumbent party or a challenger and either win or lose the seat for which they compete. In the 2010 elections for the Tanzanian parliament and the Zanzibari House of Representatives, there were 289 directly elected seats. This means that roughly 800 candidates competed in parties that won one or more seat in the legislatures. Of the 289 seats, the opposition won 75 of them (25.9%).

Thus, in addition to the legislator survey, I collaborated with the two main opposition parties in Tanzania to carry out surveys in the regions where they focus the most electoral effort. Enumerators traveled across Tanzania to party offices hundreds of miles from their head offices in Dar es Salaam and, upon arriving in the office, administered paper questions to individuals in four different groups: (1) legislative candidates who lost in the 2010 elections, (2) nomination seekers who were not selected by their party as candidates, (3) and individuals who did not seek candidacy in the 2010 elections but otherwise resembled candidates, drawn from the party’s women’s and youth wings. Table 5 below shows the distribution of participants in these two portion of the research design.

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29The dominant party presented significant barriers to carrying out the project through their party infrastructure, rendering the inclusion of them for the non-legislator survey infeasible.
Table 5: Participants in the 2013 Legislative Candidacy Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Non-Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislators</td>
<td>Losing Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>NCCR: 2</td>
<td>CUF: 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chadema: 16</td>
<td>CDM: 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 POLIS Legislator Profiles and Member CVs

The Polis database is a UNDP-funded e-government project for Tanzania. In addition to recording the activities of Parliamentarians on the floor (in terms of contributions, according to the hansard), it documents extensive background information. This includes personal status (marital status and educational attainment), previous NGO activity, previous government and party leadership, and training and qualifications. While Zanzibar’s House of Representatives version of POLIS has not been launched, I obtained the CVs of the politicians which will be used to create the database and coded them as well. Thus, this portion of the dataset includes the profiles of 725 members of the Tanzanian Parliament from 2000 to the current legislature, which will be in office until 2015. Below, is an entry from the database to serve as an illustration of its content.
6.4 Organization of the Dataset

Using the information from the legislator survey, party survey, and the POLIS database, I constructed a dataset that organized by “person-year” which chronicles the lives of politicians from their birth until the current year. In total, the dataset has 68,543 observations and is being used for other sections of this project for analyses of the sequences individuals take towards legislative candidacy in Tanzania. In the next section, I present results from a subset of the respondents. In this paper, I do not fully exploit the time-series structure of the dataset. Most of the results presented in the next section are derived from cross-sectional analyses and only use the time-series structure for ordering events, like the number of positions an individual holds prior to an election and the electoral performance of a party in a constituency after an incumbent legislator is defeated via primary.
7 Results

This section tests expectations regarding candidate selection processes and draws from a subset of the dataset discussed in the previous section. It is restricted to (1) POLIS database entries and (2) participants from the legislator survey and survey participants who were either losers in the 2010 elections or were unsuccessful nomination seekers. While it might be the case that the “non-candidates” have equally valid views about candidate selection processes, I opt for a conservative strategy by only including interviewees who have direct experience with the nomination process. I note in the text whether data for a particular figure or table are drawn from the POLIS database or from the surveys. In most cases, I restrict results involving statistical tests to CCM, CUF, and Chadema, since there are only two observations from the NCCR-Mageuzi party.

Before moving onto the discussion of candidate selection procedures, I consider the plausibility of the co-optation motivation for seeking candidacy in opposition parties.

7.1 Theory 1: Does Co-optation work for Dominant Parties?

The first extant theory introduced in the paper suggests that individuals candidate with the opposition in order to gain the appeal of the incumbent party and to illustrate their viability as a candidate for them. Doing so facilitates their later being brought into the incumbent fold and allows them to more quickly access leadership opportunities in the party. Of the 132 current members of the Parliament of Tanzania and the House of Representatives of Zanzibar who completed the survey, 32 of them reported having previously being a member of an alternate party. The survey probed which party/parties they were a member of previously and which, if any, positions they held within the party. Figure 6 illustrates the prevalence of party switching for current members of the Parliament.

Evidence in the figure shows the opposite of what the co-optation theory anticipates.
Of the 32 respondents who had switched parties prior to the 2010 elections, only about 13% of them followed the path suggested by the theory from opposition parties to the incumbent. Overwhelmingly, individuals who switch parties leave from CCM and join other viable opposition parties.

**Figure 6: Past Party-Switching of Current Tanzanian Legislators**

Additional information drawn from the losing candidate and non-candidate surveys helps illustrate this pattern. From these two groups, which are constituted of all opposition
party members as of 2010, no individual has since been co-opted by CCM. On the contrary, of the 39 respondents who have switched parties at any point prior to 2010, over 75% of them were initially members of CCM and have since become opposition party members.

Figure 7: Party-Switching of Election Losers & Unsuccessful Opposition Nominees
7.2 Original Theory: Benefits, Costs, and Probability of Winning

The original theory developed in section 3 pointed to three key factors that drive an individual’s decision to candidate with a given party: the expected benefits of winning, the likelihood of winning, and the costs incurred in the process. It was noted that each of these variables is complex, party-specific, and impacts electoral contests and nomination procedures before an election alike.

7.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Direction of the Candidate Market

Firstly, we asked the legislators if they believe the nature of candidate selection is “Party driven” or if qualified candidates can influence their fate by effectively marketing themselves to their party. The idea is akin to a labor market where firms (parties) require employees (candidates) and employees in turn seek out positions in one or more firms. Table 6 shows the distribution of responses to this question, where all respondents were asked to evaluate each party (their own and others) as to whether the party controls this market, if candidates control it, or some mixture of both. As the table shows, MPs from all parties saw the selection market for CCM candidates as strongly controlled by the party. In opposition parties, where qualified candidates are fewer, it can be easier for one to stand out and perhaps utilize their value to the party to induce concessions like nominations. The table distinguishes between CUF in mainland Tanzania (where they are weaker) and Zanzibar (where they won 49% of the Presidential vote in 2010). That we see CUF-Zanzibar’s candidate selection procedures as regulated more by the party is also consistent with the argument that higher levels of electoral competition can induce parties to impose more regulation on the candidate labor market. By comparison to mainland Tanzania, legislators in Zanzibar also have lower levels of educational attainment and political qualifications, perhaps also explain the central-nature of CUF’s Zanzibari candidate market.
Table 6: Direction of Candidate Market, All MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Market Controls</th>
<th>Candidates Control</th>
<th>Mixture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF TZ</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF ZNZ</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data are from survey

7.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Primary Turnover and Election Success

The literature informs us that one reason parties implement party primaries is that they yield more popular candidates who are better equipped to contest elections. The consequent expectation is that when incumbent legislators are purged through primaries, that the popularity of the selected candidate will carry over into the elections. So do we see the so-called “primary bump” for CCM? Figure 8 shows the change in the percentage of votes won by CCM in each constituency in Tanzania and whether an incumbent CCM legislator was the same candidate, did not contest the subsequent election, or if they were defeated through a party primary.

The figure shows that in CCM constituencies where the same candidate ran again, they lost on average about 3% of their vote share in the constituency. In fact, the only
constituencies in which CCM won over more voters in 2010 than they did in 2005 were in constituencies where the incumbent CCM legislator was eliminated in the primary process or subsequent adjustments carried out by the party secretariat.

Figure 8: CCM & the “Primary Bump” (from Polis & Election Results)

7.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Number of Primary Competitors Across Parties

Another indication of the difficulty of obtaining a nomination from a political party is the sheer number of individuals who are competing against you. Given that parties often put in place basic requirements—signature thresholds, small fees, etc.—this also serves as an indication of the number of at least modestly qualified candidates in a given constituency. Respondents were asked to report the number of individuals who were competing for the same party nomination within their constituency. This question restricted to constituency seat
members, as women’s special seats are allocated akin to a country-wide multi-member district and divided amongst parties based on the seat distribution of Parliament. Welch’s t-tests show that the average number of candidates figure 9 competing in primaries is substantially higher for the dominant party CCM.

![Figure 9: Number of Competitors faced in Primary (from Survey)](image)

**7.2.4 Hypothesis 4: Nomination Challenges by Party**

We hypothesized earlier that candidates see different barriers for winning nominations in different parties. The survey asked all candidates about what they think the difficulties are for individuals obtaining nominations for various parties. This means that all respondents—regardless of which party they were legislators, election losers, or nomination seekers for—were asked to identify whether the main barrier to obtaining nominations for candidates in
various parties were (1) the number of competitors in the primary, (2) lack of qualification of the primary competitors, or (3) the nature of the selection procedure. Figure 10 shows the results from this question.

In the figure we see that respondents believe both CCM and Chadema’s greatest nomination challengers are procedure by which candidates are selected. This aligns with the view that, while CCM uses preferential primaries to select candidates, the real decision-making power lies in the party’s center. Chadema’s process of selection is viewed by many as insufficiently transparent, as the upward cascading selection model means primary selection outcomes often occur days or weeks after the initial local selection process begins and with intermediary steps at the district and regional levels which are not well understood. Respondents are keenly aware of the challenges CCM nomination seekers face in terms of the number of rival competitors. By contrast, opposition parties struggle to field qualified individuals for primary contests.
7.2.5 Hypothesis 5: Candidate Qualification

The second factor behind the probability of being selected as a candidate pertains to the necessary loyalty and skills parties require to represent them as candidates. Our expectation is that long-standing incumbent parties have more control over the candidate selection process and also have a higher qualification pool of candidates. Consequently, the barriers to entry and level of commitment required by incumbent parties in these settings should be higher.

I assess this claim using two different approaches. The first is to determine the total number of dutiful positions held by an individual in his or her political party, ranging from service in local level party offices and on the campaign trail to holding a position in the party secretariat. The way this is measured is slightly different between the POLIS database and
survey with the legislator and non-candidate survey. The first figure, which is derived from the POLIS database, shows the average number of years a candidate held party positions at various levels of the party organization.

Figure 11: **Years in Party Positions before Candidacy (from POLIS)**

The second figure is drawn from the surveys carried out with legislators, legislative losers, and unsuccessful nomination seekers. This shows the distribution of number of positions held by respondents from the two legislatures. Both figures drive home how important party loyalty and decision is to getting opportunities to run for legislative office. Nearly half of CCM legislators held five or more—and as many as ten—positions in the party prior to seeking legislative office.
7.2.6 Hypothesis 6: Perceived Primary Odds by party

In addition to asking respondents to assess the difficulties of primary contests in their party and others, we also had them consider whether getting a nomination would have been harder or easier in other political parties. Thus, figure 13 shows how CCM legislators rate their chances of being nominated in CUF and Chadema, CUF legislators and their odds being nominated by CCM and Chadema, and Chadema respondents being nominated by CCM and CUF.

The figure shows that both CUF and Chadema legislators see CCM candidacy is much more difficult to obtain, with over 80% of respondents indicating this attitude. By comparison, most CCM legislators saw opposition party nominations as easier to obtain and
CUF and Chadema legislators viewed their odds had they run in a different opposition party as roughly similar (not shown explicitly in figure 13)

![Figure 13: (from Survey)](image)

**Primary: Harder in other party?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of Respondents Indicating 'Harder'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadema</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opposition CCM 95% CI vs CCM

T-test p-values vs CCM [CUF .00; Chadema .00]

### 7.2.7 Hypothesis 7: Failed Re-election Bids

The final hypothesis pertains to why individuals fail to win re-election bids. Opposition legislators can expect to face strong electoral challenges to second and subsequent terms, as even modest gains in opposition prospects can signal weakness in the dominant party and erosion of their stranglehold over power. On the other hand, many dominant party constituencies are locked-in for that party with little threat of opposition challenge. The POLIS/CV database contains the profiles of 725 legislators in Tanzania from 1995-2010 and of them, 204 failed re-election bids either due to electoral defeat or defeat in a primary contest. Figures 14 and 15 show the means by which legislators in Tanzania exited the Parliament. The first highlights how competitive primaries are for dominant parties, in comparison to opposition parities.
Even when including legislative turnovers due to retirement, as in figure 15, more than half of turnovers for CCM legislators are due to losing nomination bids. By contrast, only two legislators for CUF, Chadema, or NCCR were defeated via candidate selection procedures, with the remaining legislators losing either an election contest or retiring from politics.

Figure 14:
8 Conclusion

This submission has been motivated by the question of why individuals seek legislative office in dominant party systems and, particularly why they run on opposition tickets. It offered an original theory that can not only address this puzzle, but do so will also considering the full range of alternatives, including seeking incumbent party candidacy and not choosing to compete at all. Using a unique dataset, it highlighted how candidate selection rules are central to dominant parties maintain control over their large pool of prospective candidates and also how the high barriers to dominant party nominations can make opposition candidacy a viable political option.

As a part of a larger project on opposition candidacy and election success in dominant
party regimes, many additional research goals lie ahead. I am currently working with the dataset to tease out paths and sequences that individuals follow to the Parliament in order to determine whether or not opposition candidates follow paths distinctive from incumbent partisans that have a path-dependent effect on whether they seek candidacy and in which parties. Amongst other aims, this will help establish the plausibility of an underlying assumption of the theory presented in this paper: that prospective candidates truly face a choice of multiple parties when making candidacy related decisions (so, in effect, if partisanship need occur prior to candidacy decision making or, as my theory is set-up, prospective candidates can be strategic in party selection). Additional analysis will exploit comparisons between opposition participants from the legislator survey with those who were unsuccessful, giving traction on “what work” for opposition candidates in dominant party regimes.
References


van Eerd, J. (2010). Dominance and fluidity: Conceptualizing and explaining party system characteristics in sub-Saharan Africa. Presented at the Midwest Political Science Conference.